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of which illustrates a mechanism through a theoretical model. The first paper focuses on the effect of
stock market liquidity on corporate cash holdings. This paper provides empirical evidence that stock
market liquidity has a positive impact on cash holdings. The two main competing hypotheses are cascade
hypothesis and financial constraints hypothesis. Subrahmanyam and Titman (2001) study the cascade
mechanism through which stock prices affect cash flows. In this paper, the cascade hypothesis states
that firms with more liquid stocks need more cash holdings to avoid negative cascades or to stimulate
positive cascades, whereas the financial constraints hypothesis states that firms with more liquid stocks
need less cash holdings because more liquid stocks indicate less cost of external financing and then
less financial constraints. The empirical findings support the cascade hypothesis. Causality is carefully
tested through a decimalization test, which is designed based on the tick decimalization in stock markets
in 2001. Furthermore, a test by a system of simultaneous equations suggests that there is a two-way
causality between stock market liquidity and cash holdings. The second paper studies the causal impact
of stock short sales on corporate cash holdings. Short sellers benefit from the drop of stock prices, which
provides strong incentive to dig on the dark side of firms. For example, short sellers actively investigate
target firms and aggressively spread negative research reports among stakeholders (e.g. capital providers,
customers, suppliers, and employees). Short sales facilitate the incorporation of negative information into
stock prices. Attacks of short sellers isolate firms from stakeholders, increase the cost of external financing,
and decrease operational cash flow. Firms should be wary of short selling activities in financial markets.
Precautionary motive drives the firms hold cash as the ammunition for the battle with short sellers and
as unconditional liquidity support during negative events. This paper provides empirical evidence that
short-selling pressure has a positive impact on cash holdings. The results are robust after controlling for
relevant firm characteristics, heterogeneity of belief, investors’ holding horizons, institutional monitoring
incentives, and other information channels (such as financial analysts). A test by a system of simultaneous
equations supports the causal impact of short sales on cash holdings and excludes the reverse causality.
This paper also sheds light on a better understanding of the determinants of short-selling activities in
financial markets. The third paper proposes a theoretical model to demonstrate a mechanism by which
financial markets affect corporate policies when managers do not learn from financial markets. The
existing research on the real effect of financial markets on corporate policies depends on the assumption
that corporate managers learn from prices in financial markets when making corporate policies (Chen,
Goldstein and Jiang, 2007; Bond, Goldstein and Prescott, 2010; Edmans, Goldstein, and Jiang, 2012;
Fresard, 2012). The manager-learning argument is reasonable and intuitive. However, given the fact
that managers naturally have an informational advantage with regard to the firms they operate, will
financial markets affect corporate policies if managers do not need to learn from financial markets? This
paper suggests a channel based on the interaction between managers and other stakeholders. This paper
extends the idea in Subruhmanyam and Titman (2001) by considering financial constraints of the new
investment and adding a firm manager in the model structure. The manager has private information and
does not need to learn from financial market. However, other stakeholders, such as customers, suppliers,
capital providers, may learn from security prices, and their actions affect corporate cash flows and may
generate new investment opportunities. Therefore, even if managers do not need to learn from financial
markets, they still can not ignore financial markets when making corporate policies.
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Part I: Introduction
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Financial markets have feedback effects on the real economy due to the informational role of
security prices (Bond, Edmans, and Goldstein, 2012). This concept goes back to Hayek (1945),
who argues that society can share information through the price system. Economic agents make
decisions based on the information learned from security prices (Baumol, 1965; Bond, Goldstein
and Prescott, 2010). Corporate managers are influenced by the prices in financial markets when
making corporate policies (Dow and Gorton, 1997; Subruhmanyam and Titman, 1999; Luo, 2005;
Chen, Goldstein and Jiang, 2007; Bakke and Whited, 2010; Fresard, 2012; Edmans, Goldstein, and
Jiang, 2012; Hau and Lai, 2013). This dissertation studies how and why factors in financial markets
affect corporate policies, particularly the cash policy.
A fundamental objective in the research on corporate cash policy is to understand why firms
hold so much cash, given the relatively low rate of return. Bates, Kahle and Stulz (2009) demon-
strate that on average, US industrial firms more than doubled their cash holdings from 1980 to
2006 and held cash worth more than 20% of their total assets from 2000 to 2006. Corporate cash
holdings may be driven by different motives, including transaction motives (Baumol, 1952; Miller
and Orr, 1966; and Mulligan, 1997), tax motives (Foley, Hartzell, Titman, and Twite, 2007), agency
motives (Jensen, 1986; Dittmar, Mahrt-Smith, and Servaes, 2003; Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith, 2007;
Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson, 2006; Harford, Mansi, and Maxwell, 2008; Chava and Purnan-
andam, 2010; Liu and Mauer, 2011), and precautionary motives (Keynes, 1936; Opler, Pinkowitz,
Stulz and Williamson, 1999; Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach, 2004; Han and Qiu, 2007; Acharya,
Almeida, and Campello, 2007; Bates, Kahle and Stulz, 2009; McLean, 2011).
This dissertation demonstrates that the feedback effect of financial markets can affect corporate
cash holdings. The mechanism relies on the informativeness of security prices and the precautionary
motive of cash holdings. Corporate managers and other stakeholders, such as customers, suppliers,
and capital providers, take actions based on the information learned from security prices. These
actions may affect future corporate cash flows and generate new investment opportunities (Subruh-
manyam and Titman, 2001). Because of the friction of external financing, precautionary motives
drive firms to hoard cash in advance (Huberman, 1984; Acharya, Almeida, and Campello, 2007).
This dissertation includes three research papers, two of which are empirical studies and one of
which illustrates a mechanism through a theoretical model. The first paper focuses on the effect of
stock market liquidity on corporate cash holdings. This paper provides empirical evidence that stock
market liquidity has a positive impact on cash holdings. The two main competing hypotheses are
cascade hypothesis and financial constraints hypothesis. Subrahmanyam and Titman (2001) study
the cascade mechanism through which stock prices affect cash flows. In this paper, the cascade
hypothesis states that firms with more liquid stocks need more cash holdings to avoid negative
cascades or to stimulate positive cascades, whereas the financial constraints hypothesis states that
firms with more liquid stocks need less cash holdings because more liquid stocks indicate less
cost of external financing and then less financial constraints. The empirical findings support the
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cascade hypothesis. Causality is carefully tested through a decimalization test, which is designed
based on the tick decimalization in stock markets in 2001. Furthermore, a test by a system of
simultaneous equations suggests that there is a two-way causality between stock market liquidity
and cash holdings.
The second paper studies the causal impact of stock short sales on corporate cash holdings.
Short sellers benefit from the drop of stock prices, which provides strong incentive to dig on the
dark side of firms. For example, short sellers actively investigate target firms and aggressively
spread negative research reports among stakeholders (e.g. capital providers, customers, suppliers,
and employees). Short sales facilitate the incorporation of negative information into stock prices.
Attacks of short sellers isolate firms from stakeholders, increase the cost of external financing,
and decrease operational cash flow. Firms should be wary of short selling activities in financial
markets. Precautionary motive drives the firms hold cash as the ammunition for the battle with short
sellers and as unconditional liquidity support during negative events. This paper provides empirical
evidence that short-selling pressure has a positive impact on cash holdings. The results are robust
after controlling for relevant firm characteristics, heterogeneity of belief, investors’ holding horizons,
institutional monitoring incentives, and other information channels (such as financial analysts). A
test by a system of simultaneous equations supports the causal impact of short sales on cash holdings
and excludes the reverse causality. This paper also sheds light on a better understanding of the
determinants of short-selling activities in financial markets.
The third paper proposes a theoretical model to demonstrate a mechanism by which financial
markets affect corporate policies when managers do not learn from financial markets. The existing
research on the real effect of financial markets on corporate policies depends on the assumption that
corporate managers learn from prices in financial markets when making corporate policies (Chen,
Goldstein and Jiang, 2007; Bond, Goldstein and Prescott, 2010; Edmans, Goldstein, and Jiang, 2012;
Fresard, 2012). The manager-learning argument is reasonable and intuitive. However, given the fact
that managers naturally have an informational advantage with regard to the firms they operate,
will financial markets affect corporate policies if managers do not need to learn from financial
markets? This paper suggests a channel based on the interaction between managers and other
stakeholders. This paper extends the idea in Subruhmanyam and Titman (2001) by considering
financial constraints of the new investment and adding a firm manager in the model structure. The
manager has private information and does not need to learn from financial market. However, other
stakeholders, such as customers, suppliers, capital providers, may learn from security prices, and
their actions affect corporate cash flows and may generate new investment opportunities. Therefore,
even if managers do not need to learn from financial markets, they still can not ignore financial
markets when making corporate policies.
This dissertation has the following contributions. First, it contributes to cash holding literature
by specifying factors in financial markets as determinants of corporate cash holdings. For example,
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stock market liquidity and stock short sales both have positive impacts on cash holdings. Second,
the empirical papers in this dissertation provide direct evidence that financial markets have feed-
back effects on real economy and are not just a sideshow. Finally, the theoretical paper in this
dissertation supplements the literature by demonstrating a mechanism that financial markets affect
corporate policies even when managers do not learn from the financial markets. It facilitates a
better understanding of the informative role of security prices in financial markets.
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Stock Liquidity and Corporate Cash Holdings ∗†
Kjell G. Nyborg Zexi Wang
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Abstract
The literature on corporate cash holdings show that these are affected by firm char-
acteristics such as size, market-to-book, etc. We argue that there is also a financial
markets channel and, in particular, that the liquidity of a corporation’s stock influ-
ences its cash holdings. Evidence exists in the literature that stock liquidity and
cash holdings are linked, with the main idea being that a higher cash ratio reduces
information asymmetries and therefore enhances liquidity. But causality can also
flow the other way, and this is not examined or controlled for in the literature. Our
main focus is on the idea that firms with more liquid stocks hold more cash as am-
munition to fend off negative cascades or stimulate positive ones. The evidence is
supportive. Furthermore, the cash ratio sensitivity to stock liquidity is higher for
firms with larger growth options. As robustness checks to our basic results, we (i) use
the introduction of tick size decimalization in 2001 as a natural experiment where
liquidity was exogenously shocked and (ii) run a system of simultaneous equations
where cash holdings and liquidity are jointly determined. Our findings support the
view that there is two-way causality; a higher level of stock liquidity leads to more
cash holdings, and vice versa.
Keywords: Stock liquidity, cash holdings, cascades, information
JEL: G1, G3
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1 Introduction
Over the past three decades, US corporations have increased the fraction of their assets
held as cash (Bates, Kahle, and Stulz, 2009). Much has also been made by the financial
press of these seemingly large cash holdings over the course of the financial crisis. The
literature discusses both potential costs and benefits of corporate cash holdings; for ex-
ample, agency costs (Jensen, 1986), on the one hand, and benefits from avoiding the need
to tap into external markets, on the other (Myers and Majluf, 1984; Opler, Pinkowitz,
Stulz, and Williamson, 1999; Sufi, 2009; Lins, Servaes and Tufano, 2010). With respect to
the determinants of corporate cash holdings, the literature has predominantly focused on
firm characteristics; for example, size, leverage, market-to-book, cash flow volatility, and
measures of financial constraints (Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz and Williamson, 1999; Almeida,
Campello, and Weisbach, 2004; Han and Qiu, 2007; Acharya, Almeida, and Campello,
2007; Bates, Kahle and Stulz, 2009). In this paper, we argue that there is also a chan-
nel from financial markets that affect corporate cash holdings. In particular, we provide
evidence that the liquidity of a corporation’s stock affects its cash holdings.
Theory suggests that a corporation’s cash holdings and the liquidity of its stock are
related. For example, the larger is the fraction of the firm’s assets that is comprised of
cash, the smaller should informational asymmetries be and, thus, according to standard
market microstructure reasoning (Bagehot, 1971; Glosten and Milgrom, 1985; and Kyle,
1985), the more liquid should the stock be. Evidence in support of this view is provided
by Gopalan, Kadan, and Pevzner (2012). But causality can also flow the other way, and
this is not examined or controlled for by Gopalan et al. In contrast, in this paper we make
the case for two-way causality, by examining the empirical relation between cash holdings
and stock liquidity.
Our motivation for investigating the effect of stock liquidity on corporate cash holdings
comes from two strands of the theoretical literature. The first idea relates to the theory of
positive feedback from stock prices to cash flows developed by Subrahmanyam and Titman
(2001). The view that stock prices can affect fundamentals is also central in Hirshleifer,
Subrahmanyam, and Titman’s (2006) theory of stock price feedback and sentiment traders.
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As discussed by these authors as well as by Titman (1984), lower stock prices can, for
example, reduce customers’ perceptions of firms’ products and services and also firms’
ability to retain or attract key personnel. With respect to empirical evidence, Hortacsu,
Matvos, Syverson, and Venkataraman (2013) find that at increase in a car manufacturer’s
CDS spreads decreases the prices of its cars in wholesale markets. Subrahmanyam and
Titman (2001) show that positive feedback can affect cash flows from assets-in-place as
well as the value of future growth opportunities and that this can give rise to positive
feedback loops, or cascades, between stock prices and fundamentals. Our idea is that
corporations therefore have an incentive to hold cash to nip negative cascades in the bud,
or to attempt to stimulate positive cascades if the opportunity should arise, for example
by buying their own stock in the market. Because it takes more cash to move the price of
liquid stocks, under the cascade hypothesis we expect a corporation’s cash holdings to be
increasing in the liquidity of its stock.
Related to this, Goldstein, Ozdenoren, and Yuan (2013) develop a model where the
feedback mechanism works through the cost and availability of capital. These authors also
argue that negative cascades (“trading frenzies”) are more likely to occur in the first place
for more liquid stocks. This reinforces the need for corporations with more liquid stock to
hold more cash, as ammunition to ward off negative cascades.
The second theoretical idea relates to result from the market microstructure literature
that the liquidity of a stock is inversely related to the degree of information asymmetries
between investors and market makers (Glosten and Milgrom, 1985; Kyle, 1985). Using the
logic in Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), we would expect a relatively high degree of infor-
mation asymmetry to be associated with relatively large costs of information acquisition.
Thus, we would expect this to be associated with a relatively large degree of information
asymmetry between insiders and investors, as well, implying a relatively large adverse
selection problem with respect to outside financing (Myers and Majluf, 1984). In other
words, firms with less liquid stocks are more “financially constrained;” they face larger
costs of external financing, and would therefore be expected to hold more cash. This is
the opposite prediction of what we get from the cascade hypothesis. We seek to see which
of these two potential effects dominate in the data.
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These two theoretical ideas also involve differing perspectives on the role of cash with
respect to growth opportunities and investments. Subrahmanyam and Titman (2001) show
that cascades have bigger impact for firms with larger intrinsic growth opportunities.
The cascade perspective is thus essentially that firms hold cash to protect or enhance
(the value of) growth opportunities. The information/financial constraint perspective
represents the traditional precautionary motive emphasized in the literature that holding
cash protects the ability to invest, or existing shareholders’ share of the NPV from new
investments (Myers and Majluf, 1984). Hence, under the cascade hypothesis, we would
expect the cash ratio sensitivity to stock liquidity to be higher for firms with higher growth
opportunities; whereas, under the information/financial constraints hypothesis, we would
expect the opposite. In either case, we expect to see firms with higher growth opportunities
holding more cash, consistent with what is already documented in the literature (Opler,
Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson, 1999; Bates, Kahle, and Stulz, 2009).
We employ two standard measures of stock liquidity, namely Amihud’s (2002) ILLIQ
measure of price impact and the relative effective bid-ask spread (Chordia, Roll, and
Subrahmanyam, 2001). ILLIQ has the advantage of being computable for all CRSP
stocks. The relative effective bid-ask spread is calculated using the NYSE’s TAQ database,
which limits both the available time period and the set of stocks. However, our findings
do not depend in a significant way on which liquidity measure is used. To control for
information flow, in some tests we also use Roll’s (1988) price-nonsynchronicity measure
(as modified by Durnev, Morck, and Yeung, 2004). This measure is typically interpreted as
capturing the private information content of prices (Morck, Yeung, and Yu, 2000; Durnev,
Morck, and Yeung, 2004; Bushman, Piotroski, and Smith, 2002). The qualitative findings
on the effects on cash holdings of stock liquidity do not depend on whether the price-
nonsynchronicity measure is included in the regressions.
The price-nonsynchronicity measure is interesting to consider also because there is ev-
idence that increased price-nonsynchronicity is associated with more efficient investments
(Durnev, Morck, and Yeung, 2004), the idea being that high price-nonsynchronicity im-
plies more informative stock prices which, in turn, help managers make more efficient
investment decisions, as per the theories of Dow and Gorton (1997) and Subrahmanyam
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and Titman (1999). Empirical support for this view is also provided by, for example,
Chen, Goldstein, and Jiang (2007) and Bakke and Whited (2010). In addition, Fre-
sard (2012) provides evidence that price-nonsynchronicity has an impact on cash savings
(yearly changes in cash holdings). With respect to cash holdings, as we study in this
paper, we find that stock liquidity has a more consistently statistically significant effect
than price-nonsynchronicity.
We carry out several pieces of analyses. First, we regress firms’ cash ratios on measures
of lagged stock liquidity and a host of control variables, including price-nonsynchronicity
and all those used by Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2009). Cash holdings and other account-
ing data are sourced from COMPUSTAT, with CRSP and TAQ being used to calculate
measures of stock liquidity. We also use Thomson Reuters (13f) to obtain measures of
institutional ownership, as this may affect the propensity of cascades in a stock, and IBES
for analyst coverage data. These first regressions are run over several different time pe-
riods, determined by the availability of the liquidity and control variables. Regardless of
which time period,- stock liquidity measure,- or set of control variables we use, we find
that firms with more liquid stocks hold more cash as a fraction of their assets. This is
consistent with the cascade perspective.
Second, we examine the impact of stock liquidity on cash holdings for firms with differ-
ent growth opportunities, as measured by market-to-book ratios and R&D expenditures.
Again, consistent with the cascades perspective, we find that the cash ratio sensitivity to
stock liquidity is higher for firms with higher growth opportunities (higher market-to-book
ratios or R&D expenditures). Endogeneity is addressed in both the first and second set of
regressions by using lagged values of the liquidity measures.
Third, to further address endogeneity concerns, we follow Chordia, Roll, and Sub-
rahmanyam (2008) and Fang, Noe, and Tice (2009) by using the introduction of tick-
size decimalization on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), American Stock Exchange
(AMEX), and NASDAQ in 2001 as a natural experiment where liquidity is exogenously
shocked. Here, we capture liquidity by the average number of trades per day. We carry
out standard difference-in-difference tests, including the use of placebo years. Our findings
support the hypothesis that higher stock liquidity leads to an increase in cash holdings.
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Fourth, to address two-way causality, we run two-stage least squares on a system of
simultaneous equations that allows for cash ratios and stock liquidity to be jointly deter-
mined. We find support for joint causality. Increased cash holdings lead to higher stock
liquidity, as argued by Gopalan, Kadan, and Pevzner (2012), but higher stock liquidity
also leads to higher cash holdings, consistent with the idea that firms hold cash to fend
off negative cascades or stimulate positive ones.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the data and the
variables. The control variables are mostly drawn from the extant literature on corporate
cash holdings, as discussed in Section 2. Section 3 contains the first and second set of
regression results. Section 4 contains the analysis using the introduction of decimalization
as a natural experiment of an exogenous liquidity shock. Section 5 looks at joint causality,
and Section 6 concludes.
2 Data, variables, and descriptive statistics
The main datasource is the CRSP/COMPUSTAT Merged (CCM) database, 1963-2010
inclusive. We exclude financial firms (SIC code between 6000 and 6999) and utilities (SIC
code between 4900 and 4999). We only keep firm-years with positive total assets, positive
sales, and with a ratio of total debt (long term debt plus current liabilities) to total assets
that is between 0 and 1. We only include common stocks traded on NYSE, AMEX and
NASDAQ. To be included, within a fiscal year stocks need to trade on no less than 100
days, not change exchanges, and have prices not exceeding US$ 999 per share. Some firms
may have multiple classes of common shares. In the case of two classes of common shares
for a given firm-year, we take the one with the higher turnover. We delete firm-years with
more than two classes of common shares. In total, over the 1963-2010 period, this leaves
us with 92,415 firm-year observations. Because our liquidity measures are calculated on
an annual basis and we use them with a lag of one year in most regressions, the effective
sample period is 1964-2010, which yields a sample size of 92,169 firm-years. The variables
we use and supplementary databases are described below.
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2.1 Liquidity measures
In our main analysis, we use two stock liquidity measures, one using low frequency and
one using high frequency data. The low frequency measure is Amihud’s (2002) ILLIQ,1
originally defined as
ILLIQ Amihudi,t =
1
Ni
Ni∑
d=1
|ri,t,d|
DVoli,t,d
,
where ri,t,d is stock i’s rate of return on day d in year t, DVoli,t,d is the corresponding
dollar volume (in USD millions), and Ni is the number of trading days of stock i in year
t. Returns and volume data are from CRSP. Atkins and Dyl (1997) and Anderson and
Dyl (2007) note that the dealer structure on NASDAQ leads to a double counting problem
of trading volume. As suggested by Atkins and Dyl (1997) and Nagel (2005), we address
this double counting problem by dividing the reported dollar volume of NASDAQ stocks
by two. Furthermore, following Nyborg and O¨stberg (2011), we exclude daily CRSP
observations with positive volume but no recorded closing price on either day d or d − 1
and a zero return on day d, as this is highly suggestive of stale prices and spurious volume.
Finally, following Acharya and Pedersen (2005), we adjust Amihud’s ILLIQ by stock price
“inflation,” cap it to reduce the impact of extreme values, and bound it away from zero,
leaving us with the following final measure:
ILLIQi,t = min (0.25 + 0.30× ILLIQ Amihudi,t × PMt−1, 30.00), (1)
where PMt−1 is the ratio of the capitalizations of the market portfolio at the end of fiscal
year t− 1 and July 1962. To deal with endogeneity concerns, in our regressions we always
used lagged values of our liquidity measures.
The high frequency liquidity measure, which we use TAQ to compute, is the relative
effective bid-ask spread (Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam 2001, Fang, Noe, and Tice
2009). The effective spread is defined as the difference between the execution price and
the mid-point of the prevailing bid-ask quote. The relative effective bid-ask spread is the
effective spread divided by the mid-point of the prevailing bid-ask quote.
1In their tests of liquidity measures, Goyenko, Holden, and Trzcinka (2009) find that ILLIQ is the best
performing low frequency measure.
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Using TAQ, we proceed in the usual way to compute the relative effective bid ask
spread: Quotes established before the opening of the market or after the close of the mar-
ket are excluded. Quotes are also discarded if the offer price is lower than the bid price.
The trade record is excluded if it does not have a positive price or trading size. The Lee
and Ready (1991) algorithm is then used to match trades and quotes: for a trade between
1993 and 1998, the five-second rule is used; for a trade between 1999 and 2010, the trade
is matched to the first quote before the trade. The same matching methodology is used
by Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2008) and Fang, Noe, and Tice (2009). To elim-
inate potential errors in trades and quotes, following Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam
(2001), after the matching process, we exclude observations which satisfy the following
four conditions:
1. Quoted spread > $5;
2. Effective spread/Quoted spread > 4.0;
3. Relative effective spread/Relative quoted spread > 4.0;
4. Quoted spread/Transaction price > 0.4,
where Quoted spread is the difference between the prevailing quoted bid and ask, and the
Relative quoted spread is Quoted spread divided by the mid-point of the corresponding
quoted bid and ask.
The daily relative effective bid-ask spread is calculated by taking the arithmetic mean
of the transaction-level relative effective bid-ask spreads over the day. The annual relative
effective bid-ask spread is the average of daily relative effective bid-ask spreads within the
relevant fiscal year. Following Fang, Noe, and Tice (2009), we use the logarithm of the
annual relative effective bid-ask spread in our analysis, which we denote by Log resprd.
TAQ data is available from 1993. Because we used lagged measures of liquidity in most
regressions, this means that those regressions have sample periods from 1994-2010.
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2.2 Additional variables, datasources, and descriptive statistics
Cash holdings are measured for each firm-year by the Cash Ratio, i.e. cash and short-
term investment (CHE) over the total book assets (AT), where the COMPUSTAT variable
names are in parentheses. Because our main objective is to investigate the impact of
stock liquidity on corporate cash holdings, the dependent variable in our regressions is the
Cash Ratio and the main regressors are measures of stock liquidity. Control variables are
discussed below, with details provided in the Appendix.
The control variables can be divided into three subsets. First, we follow Bates, Kahle,
and Stulz (2009) by including Firm Size, MTB (market-to-book ratio), Leverage, Net
Working Capital, Net Equity Issuance, Net Debt Issuance, Dividend Dummy, R&D, Cap-
ital Expenditure, Acquisition, Cash Flow, Industry Sigma, and IPO2-IPO5 (dummies for
years after an IPO). Some of these variables, such as Firm Size and Dividend Dummy,
are also often used in the literature as measures of financial constraints. Like the Cash
Ratio, dollar denominated variables such as R&D are normalized by total assets (see the
Appendix). Not all of these COMPUSTAT variables are available over the whole 1963-
2010 period. Net Equity Issuance, Net Debt Issuance, and Acquisition are only available
from 1971. Some regressions are therefore run over the period 1971-2010.
Second, we use some controls that are found to be associated with cash holdings by
other authors. In particular, we use Analyst Coverage (Chang, 2012), Inst. Turnover
(institutional turnover) (Brown, Chen, and Shekhar, 2011), and Price-nonsynchronicity
(Fresard, 2012). Analyst coverage data are from IBES, which is available from 1976. The
data on institutional investors’ stock holdings are from Thomson Reuters (13f), which is
available from 1980. Thus, we run some regressions over a sample period from 1980-2010.
We also use institutional ownership, as in Brown et. al, but we break it up into two parts:
Inst. Own (> 5%) and Inst. Own (< 5%). Inst. Own (> 5%) is the proportion of shares
owned by institutional investors individually holding more than 5% of shares outstanding.
We use it as a proxy for corporate governance, as in Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007).
Better corporate governance can increase the value of cash holdings and thereby encourage
more cash holdings (Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith 2007, Harford, Mansi, and Maxwell 2008).
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Inst. Own (< 5%) is the remaining institutional ownership. Smaller holdings may be less
costly to unload, potentially making the stock price more vulnerable to negative news.
We expect the institutional investor turnover and both institutional ownership variables
to have positive impact on cash holdings.2
Price-nonsynchronicity is defined as ln[(1 − R2i,t)/R2i,t] following Durnev, Morck and
Yeung (2004), where R2i,t is estimated for each stock i for each year from the regression
ri,j,w = αi + βi,mrm,w + βi,jrj,w + εi,w. ri,j,w is the weekly stock return of firm i in industry
j and week w, rm,w is the weekly value-weighted market return, and rj,w is the weekly
value-weighted industry return, where industries are classified by three-digit SIC codes.
As discussed by Roll (1988) and Durnev, Morck and Yeung (2004), Price-nonsynchronicity
can be viewed as a measure of the quantity of private information flowing into stock prices.
We include this here as a control because, as discussed in the Introduction, stock liquidity
may reflect information asymmetries among investors and market makers. Furthermore,
Fresard (2012) provides some evidence that price-nonsynchronicity affects cash savings
(changes in cash holdings), which we discuss in more detail below in Subsection 3.2.
Third, we introduce two new control variables, namely Firm Age and Equity Beta.
Firm Age is expected to have a negative effect on cash holdings because young firms
tend to have relatively weak connections with corporate stakeholders, such as customers,
suppliers, employees, and investors. Thus, negative cascades are more likely to take place
for young firms (Subrahmanyam and Titman, 2001; Almanzan, Suarez, and Titman, 2009).
Equity Beta can be regarded as a proxy for the systematic risk of a business. We expect
it to have a positive impact on cash holdings, for precautionary reasons.
The sample is winsorized as follows. R&D, Acquisition, Capital Expenditure, and
Industry Sigma are winsorized on both sides at 1%. Equity Beta is winsorized on both
sides at 0.5%. Net Working Capital and Cash Flow are winsorized from the bottom at 1%
and MTB is winsorized from the top at 1%.
Insert Table 1 here.
2Quarterly institutional investor data are from Thomson Reuters 13f. Relevant variables are calculated
for each quarter and then averaged across the fiscal year to generate the annual measure.
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Table 1 displays descriptive statistics of all the variables. Statistics on the main vari-
ables, Cash Ratio and ILLIQ, are provided for four sample periods; 1964-2010, 1971-2010,
1980-2010, and 1994-2010. The average Cash Ratio ranges from 0.14 (1964-2010) to 0.18
(1994-2010), reflecting the upward drift in cash holdings documented by Bates, Kahle,
and Stulz (2009). Over the same periods, average ILLIQ is 7.84 and 8.8, respectively.
Statistics for the other variables are provided for the full period for which data is available
and as indicated in the table.
2.3 Correlations and orthogonalization
Table 2 provides the correlation matrix of all variables. The correlation between the two
liquidity measures and the Cash Ratio is 0.02, showing that unconditionally, the relation
between cash holdings and stock liquidity is weak. The variables with the largest positive
correlations with the Cash Ratio are R&D (0.48), Industry Sigma (0.38), and MTB (0.37),
which is consistent with the notions that firms hold cash to invest and for precautionary
reasons.
Insert Table 2 here.
Firm size is also a key determinant of cash holdings (Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and
Williamson, 1999; Bates, Kahle and Stulz, 2009), but is highly correlated with some of the
other regressors, leading to a potential collinearity problem when we come to run regres-
sions. Its correlations with ILLIQ, Log resprd, Price-nonsynchronicity, Analyst Coverage,
and Inst. Own (< 5%), are −0.64, −0.81, −0.57, 0.68, and 0.73, respectively. To address
this, for each year t, we orthogonalize these variables with respect to size by running OLS
as follows:
Xi,t = γ0 + γ1Firm Sizei,t + ηi,t (2)
where X is one of the mentioned variables, i is a firm. In the analysis below, we replace
the original variable, X, by the residual η from (2). We denote the size-orthogonalized
variable X by X res; e.g., ILLIQ becomes ILLIQ res and Price-nonsynchronicity becomes
Price-nonsynch res.
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3 Regression results
This section contains the first two sets of results on the relation between stock liquidity
and cash holdings. We first run a set of regressions of cash ratios on stock liquidity,
captured by the size-orthogonalized liquidity measure ILLIQ res, Price-nonsynch res, and
the other control variables discussed in Section 2. These regressions are run over different
time periods that depend on the availability of the control variables. To further examine
the cascade versus information/financial constraint hypothesis with respect to the effect of
stock liquidity on cash holdings, we run a second set of regressions using both measures of
liquidity, ILLIQ res and Log resprd res, to study the cash ratio sensitivity to stock liquidity
as a function of growth opportunities. We capture growth opportunities by two measures,
namely MTB and R&D expenditures.
3.1 Baseline regressions of cash holdings on stock liquidity
To examine the relation between cash holdings and stock liquidity, we initially use the
following specification over firm-years (i, t)
Cash Ratioi,t = β0 + β1ILLIQ resi,t−1 + Γ
′Zi,t + εi,t, (3)
where Z is a vector of control variables and Γ the corresponding vector of regression co-
efficients. The controls are as discussed in Section 2. Not all of these are available over
the whole sample period. We therefore run (3) over three time periods, namely: 1964-
2010 (the full sample period), 1971-2010 (Net Equity Issuance, Net Debt Issuance, and
Acquisition are available from 1971), and 1980-2010 (analyst coverage and institutional
holding data are available from 1976 and 1980, respectively). In this subsection, we use
only ILLIQ res to measure size-orthogonalized stock liquidity, because TAQ, which we use
to calculate the effective bid-ask spread, is not available before 1993. Since one of the
competing hypotheses we wish to examine is the information/financial constraint hypoth-
esis of the effect of stock liquidity on cash holdings, we run two sets of regressions for each
time period; one with and one without lagged Price-nonsynch res as a control.
Insert Table 3 here.
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Table 3 reports on the results from running (3) using the Fama-MacBeth procedure
(t-statistics are calculated using Newey-West standard errors with two lags).3 In all speci-
fications and all time periods, the coefficient on ILLIQ resi,t−1 is negative and statistically
significantly at the 1% level. Since stock liquidity is decreasing in ILLIQ, this means
that firms with more liquid stocks hold more cash. This is consistent with the cascade
hypothesis. The coefficient ranges from -0.0015 (1980-2010 period) to -0.0025 (1964-2010
period). So, for example over the 1964-2010 period, a one standard deviation decrease
in ILLIQ res increases the cash ratio by 2.02%. The economic significance of this can be
seen in light of the fact that the average cash holding across firm-year’s over this period
is 14% of assets, with a standard deviation of 18%. Thus, the 2.02% increase represents
an increase of approximately 15% of an average firm’s cash holdings.
The coefficient on Price-nonsynch res is statistically significantly negative, which one
can interpret as saying that the more informative is the stock price, the less cash do firms
hold, if one accepts the interpretation of Price-nonsynchronicity as a measure of the infor-
mativeness of stock prices. This appears to be in conflict with the negative coefficient on
ILLIQ res, if one views more liquid stocks as having more informative prices. It is possible
that Price-nonsynchronicity and ILLIQ capture different elements of private information
and price informativeness. We will come back to the impact of Price-nonsynch res in the
next subsection, when we also include interaction variables and can assess the robustness
of the initial findings in this subsection.
Insert Table 4 here.
The coefficients on the control variables and their statistical significance is consistent
with what is documented in the extant literature, as summarized in Table 4. For example,
we see that large firms hold less cash as a fraction of their assets, which is consistent with
their being less financially constrained, for example due to smaller information asymme-
try problems. With respect to the new control variables introduced in this paper, the
3We have also run (3) as a panel regression with industry and year fixed effects and with standard
errors clustered on firm. The results are qualitatively the same. The regressions have also been run during
the 1994-2010 sample period using both ILLIQ res and Log resprd res. Again the results are qualitatively
same, except that Price-nonsynch res is now not significant at conventional levels. Details are available
from the authors upon request. We report on regressions using Log resprd res in the next subsection.
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coefficients on Equity Beta and Firm Age are positive and negative, respectively. This is
in line with the view that firms with higher equity betas and those that are younger are
more financially constrained. The coefficients on Analyst Coverage is positive, consistent
with the cascade hypothesis, as more analyst coverage brings more attention to the firm.
Inst. Ownership (> 5%) also has a statistically significant positive coefficient, consistent
with the view that it improves corporate governance and thus increases the value of cash
holdings, which in turn leads to larger cash holdings. The coefficient on Inst. Ownership
(< 5%) is also statistically significantly positive, which we interpret as consistent with the
cascade hypothesis as discussed in Section 2.
3.2 Stock liquidity and growth opportunities
In this subsection, we investigate how the cash ratio sensitivity to stock liquidity varies
with growth opportunities. Under the cascade view, more potential growth makes firm
value more sensitive to cascades, implying that cash holdings should be increasing in stock
liquidity as growth opportunities increase. The information/financial constraint view leads
to the opposite prediction. We measure growth opportunities by MTB (market-to-book)
and R&D expenditures (normalized by assets).
This subsection expands on the analysis in the previous subsection in the following
ways. First, we use both (size-orthogonalized) measures of stock liquidity, ILLIQ res and
Log resprd res. Second, to study how the cash ratio sensitivity to stock liquidity varies
with growth opportunities, we include variables that interact our measures of growth
opportunities with our liquidity measures. Third, we also interact the growth opportunity
measures with Price-nonsynch res and Firm Size.
Table 5 reports on the results from running panel regressions, with industry and year
fixed effects and standard errors clustered on firm, as well as Fama-MacBeth regressions.
The sample period is 1994-2010, which matches the availability of TAQ data to calculate
Log resprd res (we used lagged measures of stock liquidity). Growth opportunities are
captured by MTB in Panel A and by R&D in Panel B. For each procedure (fixed effects or
Fama-MacBeth), we run four specifications, two each for each liquidity measure. The first
specification interacts the growth opportunity measure with the stock liquidity measure
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only. The second specification also interacts growth opportunities with Price-nonsynch res
and Firm Size. Thus, we run sixteen specifications in total.
Insert Table 5 here.
We see in Table 5 that in thirteen (three) of the sixteen specifications, the coefficient on
the stock liquidity measure is negative and statistically significant at the 1% (5%) level.
Thus, the result from the previous subsection that the cash ratio is increasing in stock
liquidity is shown to be robust to including interaction terms and to using Log resprd res
instead of ILLIQ res. Furthermore, and more specific to our main subject of interest
in this subsection, in fourteen (one) of the sixteen specifications, the liquidity measure ×
growth opportunity measure is negative and statistically significant at the 1% (5%) level.
Given that we retain all control variables and have size-orthogonalized the two liquidity
measures, this is strong evidence that the cash ratio is increasingly sensitive to stock
liquidity as growth opportunities increase. The more growth opportunities a firm has, the
more cash does it hold (as a fraction of assets) as its stock liquidity increases. This is
consistent with the cascade perspective, whereby holding cash serves to protect growth
opportunities from negative cascades or enhance growth opportunities from positive ones.
The results on price-nonsynchronicity are weak. Across all sixteen specifications, there
are only two instances where the coefficient on Price-nonsynch res is statistically signifi-
cant at conventional levels, and in both cases it is at the 10% level. In these two cases,
the coefficient is negative as before. In Panel A, Price-nonsynch res is interacted with our
first growth opportunity measure, MTB, in four specifications. The coefficient is positive
in all four specifications, but only statistically significant in one specification (when using
Log resprd res as the liquidity measure under the Fama-MacBeth procedure). When inter-
acting Price-nonsynch res with the other growth opportunity measure, R&D, in Panel B,
the coefficient is negative and statistically significant in three out of four cases. The re-
sults on price-nonsynchronicity are thus substantially weaker and less consistent than the
results on stock liquidity.
Our results on price-nonsynchronicity stand in contrast to those of Fresard (2012), who
finds that when regressing cash savings on MTB, MTB×Price-nonsynchronicity, firm size,
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and other controls, the coefficient on the interaction term is positive and statistically signif-
icant. While we study cash holdings and Fresard studies cash savings, it may nevertheless
be useful to briefly discuss our seemingly different results. We have re-examined Fre-
sard’s regressions in his Table IV (details available upon request) and found that in his
regressions, if we include an additional interaction term, MTB × Size, the coefficient on
MTB × Price-nonsynchronicity becomes insignificant. Recall, however, from above that
the correlation between Firm Size and Price-nonsynchronicity is large in absolute value,
so including these in the same regression as Fresard does is problematic. If instead of
including MTB × Size in Fresard’s regressions, we simply replace Price-nonsynchronicity
by Price-nonsynch res, we find that the coefficient on the interaction term is insignificant
(details available from the authors upon request). This parallels our findings on cash
holdings (rather than savings) in Table 5, Panel A.
Our finding that the cash ratio sensitivity to Price-nonsynch res falls as R&D expen-
ditures increase can be interpreted in light of a standard Myers and Majluf (1984) style
argument, predicated on the idea that Price-nonsynchronicity measures the informative-
ness of prices. First, when the flow of private information into prices is larger, this may
also involve a lower degree of information asymmetries between managers and outsiders.
In turn, this reduces the costs of external financing and therefore also the importance of
holding financial slack (cash). This is especially relevant for firms with large R&D expen-
ditures because, in the first instance, the R&D needs to be financed and, in the second, so
do the opportunities that the R&D lead to. Indeed, the regression coefficients in Table 5
on R&D itself is positive. Our finding can therefore be interpreted as follows: While cash
holdings increase in R&D, the effect is reduced for firms with more informative stock prices
because this is associated with less costly external financing.
It may seem surprising that we do not find a similar effect for the market-to-book ratio.
An explanation may be that information asymmetries between investors and managers
relate mostly to the likelihood of success of R&D and new technologies rather than to the
growth of existing lines of business. This may explain why price-nonsynchronicity works
better when interacted with R&D than with MTB, as the latter measure also captures
projected growth from expanding current lines of business.
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With respect to our other controls, we note that in all specifications, the coefficient on
the growth opportunity × Firm Size interaction variable is positive, showing that larger
firms hold relatively more cash as their growth opportunities increase. This may reflect
that more is at stake for larger firms. All other controls are in line with the findings in
the previous subsection and the extant literature, as summarized above in Table 4.
4 Endogeneity: Decimalization test
In the previous section, we dealt with the potential endogeneity of stock liquidity by
lagging it. Orthogonalizing the liquidity measures by size, which we did because of the high
correlation coefficient with Firm Size, also helps with respect to endogeneity as it reduces
persistence in the measure of stock liquidity we use in the regressions. In this section, we
take an alternative tack. We use the introduction of decimalization in stock exchanges as a
natural experiment where stock liquidity is exogenously shocked. Specifically, on January
29, 2001, the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and American Stock Exchange (AMEX)
changed the minimal tick size from 1/16th of a dollar (6.25 cents) to 1 cent. NASDAQ
decimalized on April 9, 2001.4
The extant literature shows that the introduction of tick size decimalization affected
stock liquidity heterogeneously. Bessembinder (2003) and Furfine (2003) find that the
quoted bid-ask spreads and price impact declined more for more actively traded stocks.
Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2008) and Fang, Noe, and Tice (2009) have used this
exogenous and asymmetric effect on stock liquidity to study the effect of stock liquidity
on market efficiency and firm performance, respectively. Under the cascade hypothesis,
we expect that more actively traded stocks, which experienced a bigger improvement in
their liquidity as a result of decimalization, should have a larger increase in cash holdings
than less liquid stocks.
We measure how actively a stock is traded by the total number of trades (Num trades)
in a fiscal year. This is extracted from TAQ. The test sample includes observations in
4Pilot programs were carried out before trading on all listed stocks were decimalized. For example, at
the NYSE, decimalization was introduced for 159 securities between August and December in 2000. At
the NASDAQ, decimalization was introduced for 211 securities in March 2001.
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the year before and the year after the introduction of decimalization. This relatively long
window around the introduction of decimalization follows Fang, Noe, and Tice (2009) and
provides time for the change in liquidity to affect a firm’s cash holdings. We divide the test
sample into the 50% most active and the 50% least active stocks, based on the number of
trades in the year before the introduction of decimalization.
We use the following specification:
∆Cash ratioi = β0 + β1Dummy Activei + Γ
′(∆Zi) + εi, (4)
where ∆Cash ratioi is the change in the cash ratio for firm i from the fiscal year prior to
decimalization (2000) to the year after (2002), Dummy Active is an indicator variable that
equals 1 for the 50% most active stocks and 0 for the least active stocks, ∆Zi is a vector of
changes in the control variables for firm i from the year prior to decimalization to the year
after, and Γ is the corresponding vector of regression coefficients. The control variables
include all those in Table 3 and IPO1, which is a dummy for the first year after an IPO.5
The regression (4) is run using OLS. Reported t-values are calculated using White’s (1980)
correction for heteroskedasticity.
Insert Table 6 here.
The regression results are shown in Table 6, Panel A. The coefficient on Dummy Active
is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. In other words, more active stocks,
whose liquidity improved the most as a result of decimalization, experienced a larger
increase in cash holdings after decimalization than less active stocks. This is consistent
with the cascade hypothesis and the results in Section 3.
As a robustness check to our decimalization test, we carry out a placebo test where we
re-run (4) for each year from 1996 to 2006 (i.e. where 1996, for example, takes the place of
2001 in the original test). As seen in Panel B of Table 6, the coefficient on ∆Cash Ratio
is significantly different from zero only for 2001, the year decimalization was introduced.
Thus, our findings in this section support the hypothesis that higher stock liquidity leads
5Unlike the regressions in Table 3, no lagged variable is used in the current test, allowing us to include
IPO1 among the regressors.
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to more cash holdings. It is consistent with the cascade hypothesis, but hard to reconcile
with the financial constraint hypothesis with respect to stock liquidity.
5 Joint causality: Simultaneous equation system
In this section, we use a simultaneous equation system to investigate two-way causality
between stock liquidity and corporate cash holdings. Because of the availability of all
variables, we focus on the 1994-2010 period. The specification of the linear equation
system is as follows:
Cash Ratioi,t = α0 + α1Liq resi,t +
K∑
k=2
αkZk,i,t−1 + εi,t (5)
Liq resi,t = β0 + β1Cash Ratioi,t +
L∑
l=2
βlXl,i,t−1 + ηi,t (6)
where Liq is ILLIQ res or Log resprd res. Zk,i,t−1 represent lagged controls in the Cash
Ratio equation, (5). These include the same variables as in our baseline regression in Table
3 (column 6), except that we now use lagged values for all controls, as well as dummies
for the 48 Fama-French industry categories. Xl,i,t−1 are the control variables in the stock
liquidity regression, (6).
Our choice of controls in the liquidity equation draws on the extant literature. As
in the literature, we use stock characteristics, firm characteristics, and institutional re-
lated variables. In particular, we use the following stock characteristic variables: Market
Capitalization, Stock Price, and Return Volatility, Equity Beta (Heflin and Shaw, 2000;
Loughran and Stulz, 2005; Chordia, Huh, Subruhmanyam, 2007; Agarwal, 2007; Rubin,
2007; Brockman, Chung, and Yan, 2009). With respect to firm characteristics, we use
MTB, Firm Age, and Leverage (Chordia, Huh, and Subrahmanyam, 2007) and R&D and
Cash Flow (Agarwal, 2007). Motivated by the investor recognition idea of Merton (1987),
we also use IPO year dummies and Acquisition, as IPOs and acquisitions may attract
investor attention, which in turn may affect trading activity and stock liquidity. With
respect to institutional related variables, we use Analyst Coverage (Chordia, Huh, and
Subrahmanyam, 2007), institutional turnover (Agarwal, 2007), and institutional owner-
29
ship (Heflin and Shaw, 2000; Agarwal, 2007; and Brockman, Chung, and Yan, 2009),
which we break up into Inst. Own (> 5%) and Inst. Own (< 5%) as before. The new
variables we use are thus IPO year dummies, Acquisition, and Inst. Own (< 5%). The
controls in (6), as in (5), also include dummies for the 48 Fama-French industry categories.
The two equation system, (5) and (6), is estimated by the Fama-MacBeth procedure,
using two-stage least squares (2SLS) for each yearly cross-section. In particular, for each
year t, using OLS we regress Liq res (Cash Ratio) on all controls from both equations and
obtain the fitted values L̂iq res ( ̂Cash Ratio), which we then use in the Cash Ratio (Liq res)
regression in place of Liq res (Cash Ratio). The estimated coefficients are then averaged
over all years. t values are calculated using Newey and West (1987) standard errors with
two lags. This is the same procedure used by Chordia, Huh, and Subrahmanyam (2007)
in their examination of trading activity and analyst coverage.
Insert Table 7 here.
Table 7, Panel A reports on the results for the Cash Ratio equation. The first column
is based on Log resprd res as the liquidity measure (with t-statistics in the second column),
while the third column is based on ILLIQ res as the liquidity measure (t-statistics in the
fourth column). The results confirm our findings in Tables 3 and 5 that cash holdings are
increasing in stock liquidity, regardless of which of the two measures of stock liquidity we
use. Statistical significance is at the 1% level in either case. Panel B reports on the results
for the liquidity equation. For either of the two liquidity measures, we see that stock
liquidity is increasing in cash holdings. Statistical significance is at the 1% level in either
case here as well. These results support the hypothesis that the causality between stock
market liquidity and corporate cash holdings is bi-directional, as predicted by theory. In
particular, this is consistent with (i) the theoretical idea that a higher level of corporate
cash holdings reduces information asymmetries and therefore increases the liquidity of the
corporation’s stock, and (ii) the more liquid a corporation’s stock is the more cash does it
hold in order protect itself from negative cascades or to stimulate positive ones.
With respect to the control variables, we see in Panel A that their effect on cash
holdings are largely the same as documented in Table 3. Given that all controls are lagged
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in Table 7, this supports the robustness of the previous findings on their impact on cash
holdings. When using ILLIQ res as the liquidity measures, the most noteworthy difference
is the coefficient on Inst. Own (< 5%), which goes from significantly positive (Table 3)
to significantly negative (Table 7, Panel A). Industry Sigma is not significant in Table
7, unlike in Table 3, because the system in Table 7 is estimated with industry dummies.
When industry dummies are not included, Industry Sigma is significantly positive (details
available upon request).
Price-nonsynch res has opposite signs when using ILLIQ res (negative, significant at
1% level) as compared with Log resprd res (positive, significant at 10% level). Recall,
however, from Table 5 that the effect of Price-nonsynch res disappears when including
interaction terms. Still, the change in sign here is reminiscent of the change in sign in
Table 5 on the interaction variable of size and Price-nonsynch res when using R&D rather
than MTB as the growth opportunity measure. This suggests that more work may be
needed in order to understand the price-nonsynchronicity measure better and that caution
needs to be exercised when interpreting regression coefficients on Price-nonsynchronicity
or Price-nonsynch res.
Panel B summarizes our findings on the relation between stock liquidity and the control
variables. With respect to the new variables we have introduced, we observe that Inst.
Own (< 5%) has a statistically significantly negative effect (1% level) on both liquidity
measures, i.e., a high fraction of relatively small institutional owners is positively associated
with stock liquidity. Acquisition and R&D expenditures as a fraction of total assets also
decrease ILLIQ res, which is consistent, for example, with the view that acquisition activity
and R&D intensity increases investor recognition and thus stock liquidity. With respect
to the other variables, our resuls are broadly consistent with the extant literature. Stock
liquidity, regardless of measure, is positively related to MTB, Stock Return, Equity Beta,
and Analyst Coverage; and negatively related to Return Volatility and Leverage.
Our main point, here, however is that the results from our estimation of the simultane-
ous equation system of cash ratio and stock liquidity support the view that there is joint
causality between cash holding and stock liquidity. A more liquid stock causes higher cash
holdings, and vice versa.
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6 Concluding remarks
We have provided evidence that supports the idea that there is a channel from the stock
market to corporate financial policy. In particular, controlling for firm size and other
standard variables in the cash holding literature, we have found that corporations with
more liquid stock have higher cash ratios. Furthermore, the cash ratio sensitivity to stock
liquidity is increasing in growth opportunities, measured by the market-to-book ratio or
R&D expenditures normalized by total assets. This is consistent with the idea that the
stock market channel with respect to cash holdings relates to positive feedback effects
between stock markets and cash flows, along the lines of the theoretical contributions
of Subrahmanyam and Titman (2001) or Goldstein, Ozdenoren, and Yuan (2013). Our
analysis also provides support for the view that there is two-way causality between stock
liquidity and cash holdings. Given our findings, an interesting avenue for future research
would be to investigate whether market characteristics of a corporation’s stock also affects
other elements of its financial policy.
With respect to control variables, our analysis introduces two variables that have not
previously been studied in the corporate cash literature. We find that the age of a firm is
negatively associated with its cash ratio, consistent with the idea that younger firms face
harder financial constraints. It is also consistent with the idea that cascades are more likely
in younger firms, as they have less strong relations with customers and other stakeholders
that can affect their value. With respect to the second new variable we introduce, we find
that the beta of a firm’s stock is positively related with its cash ratio, which is perhaps
not surprising from a precautionary perspective.
One of the many control variables we use in this study is price-nonsynchronicity (Roll,
1988; Durnev, Morck, and Yeung, 2004). This variable is of separate interest, since it is
widely used in the literature to gauge price informativeness. Because it is highly correlated
with firm size, we size-orthogonalize it, as we do our stock liquidity measures. We find
that firms with large R&D expenditures, which tend to hold more cash, reduce their cash
holdings when price-nonsynchronicity becomes large. This is consistent with the view
that more informative prices reduces the costs of external financing and thus reduces the
32
relative value of financial slack (Myers and Majluf, 1984). Interestingly, we do not find the
same effect when measuring growth opportunities using the market-to-book ratio. This
suggests that price-nonsynchronicity captures informativeness about growth opportunities
from new products or technologies, rather than from existing lines of business.
In addition to our main finding that a higher level of stock liquidity leads to more
cash holdings, and vice versa, we have also provided evidence on factors other than cash
holdings that seem to affect stock liquidity. Our findings are broadly in line with the extant
literature on this topic and supplement it by showing that stock liquidity is positively
related to acquisition and R&D expenditures as well as the quantity of small institutional
stakes in the stock. Gaining a deeper understanding of stock liquidity and its effects
remains an important direction for future research.
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Table 3
Fama-MacBeth regressions of Cash Ratio on ILLIQ res and controls
This table presents Fama-MacBeth (1973) estimators for regressions of the type:
Cash Ratioi,t = β0 + β1ILLIQ resi,t−1 + Γ
′Zi,t + εi,t,
where Z is a vector of control variables and Γ the corresponding vector of regression coefficients. Regressions
are run over the following three time periods: 1964-2010 (the full sample period), 1971-2010 (Net Equity
Issuance, Net Debt Issuance, and Acquisition are available from 1971), and 1980-2010 (analyst coverage and
institutional holding data are available from 1976 and 1980, respectively). Two sets of regressions are run for
each time period: one with and one without lagged Price-nonsynch res as a control. t values are calculated
based on Newey-West (1987) standard errors with 2 lags. Statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%
level are indicated by a, b, and c respectively.
Cash Ratio Since 1964 Since 1971 Since 1980
Intercept 0.2304a 0.2290a 0.2636a 0.2641a 0.2672a 0.2685a
(14.37) (13.77) (20.92) (20.78) (26.16) (28.62)
Lag(ILLIQ res) -0.0025a -0.0024a -0.0016a -0.0016a -0.0015a -0.0015a
(-3.81) (-3.95) (-7.98) (-8.07) (-13.70) (-12.92)
Lag(Price-nonsynch res) -0.0010a -0.0009a -0.0008b
(-3.33) (-3.40) (-2.13)
Firm Size -0.0098a -0.0096a -0.0094a -0.0091a -0.0104a -0.0101a
(-12.52) (-11.79) (-10.65) (-10.06) (-10.86) (-10.46)
Leverage -0.2633a -0.2612a -0.2897a -0.2878a -0.3110a -0.3108a
(-15.22) (-14.68) (-19.80) (-18.69) (-29.39) (-28.66)
MTB 0.0211a 0.0207a 0.0192a 0.0188a 0.0160a 0.0154a
(13.39) (12.56) (9.28) (8.63) (11.02) (11.07)
Firm Age -0.0013 -0.001 -0.0045b -0.0047b -0.0048b -0.0052b
(-0.42) (-0.32) (-2.18) (-2.25) (-2.19) (-2.49)
Net Working Capital -0.2386a -0.2370a -0.2585a -0.2582a -0.2762a -0.2778a
(-25.34) (-23.88) (-26.19) (-25.03) (-30.02) (-30.87)
Net Equity Issuance 0.0891a 0.0896a 0.1109a 0.1132a
(4.98) (4.84) (6.19) (6.29)
Net Debt Issuance 0.1909a 0.1901a 0.2123a 0.2141a
(10.98) (10.64) (10.65) (10.80)
Dividend Dummy -0.0095a -0.0099a -0.0099b -0.0104a -0.0131a -0.0134a
(-2.71) (-2.78) (-2.71) (-2.88) (-5.18) (-4.96)
R&D 0.2491a 0.2557a 0.3057a 0.3121a 0.3777a 0.3845a
(3.67) (3.76) (4.86) (5.00) (6.74) (6.95)
Capital Expenditure -0.4330a -0.4365a -0.5469a -0.5509a -0.5985a -0.6032a
(-14.24) (-14.81) (-16.19) (-16.16) (-16.35) (-16.51)
Acquisition -0.3713a -0.3711a -0.4198a -0.4202a
(-11.52) (-11.30) (-11.69) (-11.45)
Cash Flow -0.0644a -0.0607a -0.0079 -0.005 -0.0175 -0.0144
(-5.45) (-5.33) (-0.82) (-0.51) (-1.54) (-1.32)
Continued on next page
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Table 3 – continued from previous page
Cash Ratio Since 1964 Since 1971 Since 1980
Lag(Industry Sigma) 0.3812a 0.3349a 0.3340a 0.3085a 0.3304a 0.3268a
(5.25) (4.76) (7.70) (6.32) (8.56) (7.52)
Lag(Equity Beta) 0.0109a 0.0106a 0.0115a 0.0112a 0.0129a 0.0127a
(4.95) (4.71) (4.75) (4.49) (4.61) (4.38)
Analyst Coverage res 0.0035b 0.0035c
(2.07) (1.90)
Inst. Own. (> 5%) 0.0401a 0.0407a
(5.83) (5.81)
Inst. Own. (< 5%) res 0.0197a 0.0188b
(3.09) (2.65)
Inst. Turnover 0.1140a 0.1170a
(3.73) (4.05)
IPO2 0.0119b 0.0140b 0.0104c 0.0117c 0.0191b 0.0196b
(2.10) (2.47) (1.73) (1.95) (2.58) (2.67)
IPO3 0.0011 0.0019 -0.0015 -0.0016 0.0012 0.0007
(0.27) (0.44) (-0.38) (-0.40) (0.26) (0.13)
IPO4 0.0023 0.0021 0.0003 0.0002 0.0013 0.0011
(0.60) (0.54) (0.06) (0.05) (0.31) (0.24)
IPO5 0.0015 0.0019 -0.0009 -0.0000 0.0017 0.0022
(0.39) (0.45) (-0.19) (-0.01) (0.33) (0.40)
R2 0.40 0.40 0.43 0.43 0.47 0.47
N 78,500 75,157 73,597 70,604 59,921 57,611
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Table 6
Endogeneity: Decimalization test with placebo robustness analysis
Panel A shows the OLS estimators of the specification
∆Cash Ratioi = β0 + β1Dummy Activei + Γ
′(∆Zi) + εi,
where ∆Cash Ratioi is the change in the Cash Ratio for firm i from the fiscal year prior to
decimalization (2000) to the year after (2002), Dummy Active is an indicator variable that
equals 1 for the 50% most active stocks and 0 for the least active stocks, ∆Zi is a vector of
changes in the control variables for firm i from the year prior to decimalization to the year after,
and Γ is the corresponding vector of regression coefficients. The control variables include all
those in Table 3 and IPO1, which is a dummy for the first year after an IPO. Panel B displays
the results of placebo tests, in which the regression is re-run for each year from 1996 to 2006
(i.e. where 1996, for example, takes the place of 2001 in the original test). In Panel B, only
βˆ1 is shown. t-values are calculated using White’s (1980) adjustment for heteroscedasticity.
Statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level are indicated by a, b, and c respectively.
Coefficient t-value
Panel A: Decimalization test
Intercept 0.0045 0.82
Dummy Active 0.0182a 3.09
∆ Price-nonsynch res 0.0002 0.13
∆ Firm Size -0.0160 -1.54
∆ Leverage -0.2548a -7.10
∆ MTB 0.0018 0.58
∆ Net Working Capital -0.2198a -6.30
∆ Net Equity Issuance 0.1492a 5.35
∆ Net Debt Issuance 0.1187a 2.63
∆ Dividend Dummy -0.0030 -0.33
∆ R&D -0.2210c -1.77
∆ Capital Expenditure -0.1864b -2.50
∆ Acquisition -0.2334a -4.88
∆ Cash Flow 0.0006 0.02
∆ Industry Sigma -0.1698 -0.68
∆ Equity Beta -0.0081 -1.19
∆ Analyst Coverage res -0.0035 -0.58
∆ Inst. Own. (< 5%) res 0.0368 1.07
∆ Inst. Own. (> 5%) 0.0737b 2.21
∆ Inst. Turnover -0.0751 -0.72
∆ IPO1 0.0075 0.33
∆ IPO2 -0.0126 -0.77
∆ IPO3 0.0252 1.49
∆ IPO4 -0.0047 -0.38
∆ IPO5 0.0060 0.49
#Obs 1387
Adj-R2 0.18
Continued on next page
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Table 6 – continued from previous page
βˆ1 t-value
Panel B: Placebo test
Placebo year
1996 0.0034 0.72
1997 0.0078 1.51
1998 0.0027 0.49
1999 0.0017 0.29
2000 -0.0004 -0.06
2001 0.0182a 3.09
2002 0.0073 1.35
2003 -0.0041 -0.68
2004 -0.0009 -0.14
2005 0.0082 1.44
2006 -0.0028 -0.48
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Table 7
Two-way causality: Simultaneous equation system
This table displays the results from running a system of two simultaneous equations:
(i) Cash Ratioi,t = α0 + α1Liq resi,t +
∑K
k=2 αkZk,i,t−1 + εi,t,
(ii) Liq resi,t = β0 + β1Cash Ratioi,t +
∑L
l=2 βlXl,i,t−1 + ηi,t,
where Liq res is ILLIQ res or Log resprd res, Zk,i,t−1 are lagged controls in the Cash Ratio equation (i),
and Xl,i,t−1 are lagged controls in the stock liquidity regression (ii). The system is estimated by a Fama-
MacBeth procedure, using two-stage least squares (2SLS) for each yearly cross-section. In particular,
for each year t, Liq res (Cash Ratio) is regressed on all controls from both equations, yielding fitted
values L̂iq res ( ̂Cash Ratio), which are then used in the Cash Ratio (Liq res) regression in place of Liq res
(Cash Ratio). The estimated coefficients are then averaged over all years. t values are calculated using
Newey and West (1987) standard errors with two lags. Panel A shows the results of the Cash Ratio
equation. Panel B shows the results of the stock liquidity equation. The sample period is from 1994 to
2010. Fama-French 48 industry dummies are included among the control variables in both equations, but
their coefficients are not shown here. Statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level are indicated by
a, b, and c respectively.
Liq res is: Log resprd res ILLIQ res
Coef. t-value Coef. t-value
Panel A: Cash Ratio as dependent variable
Intercept 0.2837a 29.15 0.2917a 19.29
Log resprd res -0.0704a -9.93
ILLIQ res -0.0065a -5.23
Price-nonsynch res 0.0007c 1.97 -0.0016a -4.60
Firm Size -0.0160a -10.13 -0.0119a -13.30
Leverage -0.2510a -31.53 -0.2583a -31.14
MTB 0.0029b 2.48 0.0056a 5.91
Firm Age -0.0081a -3.58 -0.0051b -2.52
Net Working Capital -0.2669a -24.00 -0.2784a -18.70
Net Equity Issuance 0.0475a 3.34 0.0304c 1.92
Net Debt Issuance 0.1705a 12.50 0.1699a 11.02
Dividend Dummy -0.0214a -9.13 -0.0186a -6.80
R&D 0.4927a 28.39 0.4823a 23.37
Capital Expenditure -0.5815a -14.73 -0.5857a -14.67
Acquisition -0.4246a -22.42 -0.4342a -22.23
Cash Flow -0.0596a -4.84 -0.0574a -3.67
Industry Sigma 0.1696 1.42 0.1720 1.48
Equity Beta 0.0136a 4.01 -0.0007 -0.12
Analyst Coverage res 0.0042b 2.40 0.0076a 4.06
Inst. Own (> 5%) 0.0460a 10.43 0.0076 0.62
Inst. Own (< 5%) res -0.0871a -8.20 -0.0546a -4.17
Inst. Turnover 0.1337a 5.32 0.0261 0.45
IPO2 0.0001 0.03 0.0032 0.78
IPO3 -0.0066c -1.87 -0.0058 -1.58
IPO4 -0.0070 -1.36 -0.0069 -1.49
IPO5 -0.0097b -2.35 -0.0096b -2.64
Continued on next page
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Table 7 – continued from previous page
Liq res is: Log resprd res ILLIQ res
Coef. t-value Coef. t-value
Panel B: Liq res as dependent variable
Intercept 0.3357a 7.64 1.6659 1.54
Cash Ratio -0.8219a -11.24 -7.4969a -5.21
Market Capitalization - log -0.0245 -1.38 0.3384a 3.09
Leverage 0.1986a 5.33 2.1723a 3.32
MTB -0.0762a -10.54 -0.8518a -6.01
Firm Age -0.0184 -1.13 0.5191a 5.71
Cash Flow -0.1704b -2.90 -0.4416 -0.68
R&D 0.0976 1.66 -2.9071a -3.96
Acquisition -0.1300 -1.52 -3.4846a -4.25
Equity Beta -0.0701a -4.66 -2.9175a -9.21
Stock Price - log -0.1142a -3.95 -0.4354 -1.56
Stock Annual Return -0.1398a -8.16 -1.3929a -7.44
Stock Return Volatility 3.0627b 2.28 77.5268a 3.05
Analyst Coverage res -0.0607a -4.55 -0.4069a -4.79
Inst. Own (> 5%) 0.0196 0.26 -5.2964a -4.44
Inst. Own (< 5%) res -1.3298a -11.99 -9.9978a -5.95
Inst. Turnover 0.1396 1.21 -17.9855a -5.10
IPO2 -0.0005 -0.03 0.4058 1.46
IPO3 -0.0223 -1.26 -0.2806 -1.13
IPO4 -0.0041 -0.26 -0.2101 -0.61
IPO5 -0.0294c -1.75 -0.2996 -1.48
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employees, can infer the negative information from stock prices for their decision
making. The actions of short sellers increase the cost of external financing, decrease
operational cash flows, and function as a catalyst of firms’ financial distress. Corpo-
rate cash holdings can serve as the ideal ammunition for the battle with short sellers
and as unconditional liquidity support during negative events. Consistent with the
precautionary motive of cash holding, this paper finds that short-selling pressure
has a positive impact on cash holdings. The results are robust after controlling
for relevant firm characteristics, heterogeneity of belief, investors’ holding horizons,
institutional monitoring incentives, and alternative information channels (such as
financial analysts). A test by a simultaneous equation system confirms the causal
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1 Introduction
Short sales facilitate the incorporation of negative information into stock prices (Miller,
1977; Diamond and Verrecchia, 1987), and society can share this negative information
through the price system (Hayek, 1945). Corporate stakeholders, such as capital providers,
customers, suppliers, managers and other employees, update their relationships with firms
based on the information that they have obtained from stock prices (Baumol, 1965; Bond,
Goldstein and Prescott, 2010). In a negative event, actions of short sellers exacerbate
situations as a catalyst1 and make firms more likely to suffer from financial distress be-
cause of more expensive external financing and lower operational cash flows (Goldstein,
Ozdenoren, and Yuan, 2013; Subruhmanyam and Titman, 2001). Furthermore, firms may
require liquidity support to combat short sellers (Lamont, 2012). Thus, according to
the precautionary motive of cash holdings (Keynes, 1936; Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and
Williamson, 1999; Han and Qiu, 2007; Bates, Kahle and Stulz, 2009), short sales should
have a positive impact on corporate cash holdings. However, no empirical evidence has
been provided for this relationship to date. This paper supplements the literature by em-
pirically examining whether and why short sales in stock markets affect corporate cash
holdings.
First, this study demonstrates that short-sale demand has a positive impact on cash
holdings. A high short-interest ratio (short interest over shares outstanding) indicates
strong demand from short sellers and is a negative signal for a firm’s future. In such a
situation, managers hoard more cash because they expect higher capital costs, reduced
cash flows, and an expensive fight with short sellers. Furthermore, consistent with the
precautionary motive of cash holdings, this study offers evidence that the heterogeneity
of firm characteristics affects the cash holding sensitivity to short sales. For example,
the cash holdings of firms with higher levels of business risk and firms with higher R&D
expenses are more sensitive to short-selling activities in the stock market. A multivariate
analysis regresses cash holdings on the lagged short-interest ratio and control variables, and
the control variables follow Bates, Kahle and Stulz (2009). For robustness purposes, the
1See an example of Carson Block and Sino-Forest in Appendix 2.
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results of the following three econometric estimators are reported: Fama-MacBeth (1973)
estimator, OLS estimator (clustering both firm and year) (Petersen, 2009), and industry
and year fixed-effect estimator. All of these estimators demonstrate the consistent and
significantly positive impact of short-sale demand on cash holdings.
Second, this study provides evidence that the short-sale constraint reduces precau-
tionary cash holdings. Short-sale constraint is measured through institutional ownership
(Asquith, Pathak, and Ritter, 2005; Nagel, 2005) because institutional investors are the
main suppliers of equity loans for short sales (D’Avolio, 2002). High levels of institutional
ownership indicate a low short-sale constraint, and should lead to greater cash holdings.
The empirical evidence verifies the positive impact of institutional ownership. However,
there are other potential explanations for this effect. For example, high levels of institu-
tional ownership may signal better corporate governance and increase the value of cash
and optimal cash holdings; or active trading by institutional investors may make the stock
prices more vulnerable to negative news (Brown, Chen, and Shekhar, 2011). To clarify
that the impact of institutional ownership on cash holdings operates because of concerns
about short selling, the following tests are done. Firstly, the divergence of opinion among
investors is considered. Together with low short-sale constraints (high institutional owner-
ship), significant divergence of opinion indicates strong demand for short-selling and should
strengthen the effect on cash holdings. Supportive evidence is provided below. Secondly,
to disentangle with the “better governance” explanation (“active trading” explanation) of
institutional ownership, blockholder ownership (investors’ holding horizon) is controlled,
and the impact of institutional ownership on cash holdings remains significantly positive.
Third, this study demonstrates that short selling has a unique impact that is different
from alternative information channels. For example, financial analysts make firms’ per-
formances more transparent to the public and analysts’ preferences can affect corporate
policies (Degeorge, Derrien, Kesckes and Michenaud, 2012); market liquidity stimulates
trading frenzies in financial markets, which have feedback effects on capital providers and
corporate financing (Goldstein, Ozdenoren, and Yuan, 2013; Nyborg and Wang, 2013).
Controlling for analyst coverage and stock liquidity, short sales continue to have signifi-
cant impact on cash holdings.
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Fourth, this study investigates the causality in the relationship between short sales and
cash holdings through a simultaneous equation system. Theoretically, short sellers should
have less interest in a firm with plenty of cash holdings because such a firm has more
instruments to protect its stock price. The causality test confirms the short sale’s causal
impact on cash holdings and rejects reverse causality. Furthermore, the test sheds light on
the determinants of short selling in financial markets. The evidence indicates that short
sellers tend to target firms with loose stock short-sale constraints, heterogeneous investors’
beliefs, volatile performances, fragile capital structures, and weak stakeholder connections.
This paper contributes to the cash holding literature by specifying short sale as a
factor that affects precautionary cash holding. Managers should be wary of short-selling
activities, or even the potential of short-selling in negative scenarios. In particular, R&D-
intensive firms and firms with riskier businesses are more sensitive to short-selling activ-
ities because these firms are more vulnerable to short-selling attacks. This paper also
contributes to the literature on the real effects of financial markets. It explains how short
selling in financial markets affects corporate cash policy; like a catalyst, short sales am-
plify the effects of negative news, and firms under attack are more likely to suffer from
financial distress. Furthermore, this paper facilitates a better understanding of deter-
minants of short-selling activities in financial markets. Short sellers prefer stocks with
fewer constraints on short selling, higher heterogeneity of investors’ belief, more volatile
performance, and weaker stakeholder connections. Finally, this paper suggests that short
sellers may play a role in market monitoring (Tirole, 2001) and sheds light on formulating
regulations of short selling. Short sellers benefit from the negative events of firms and
have strong incentives to dig deeply into the dark side of companies, which affects firm
managers’ decision making on corporate policies. Short-selling bans may have effects on
corporate policies through the feedback effect of financial markets.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant lit-
erature and develops the hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data and variables. Section 4
presents the evidence of the demand-side impact of short sales. Section 5 demonstrates how
short-sale constraints affect cash holdings. Section 6 presents the robustness check with
alternative information channels. Section 7 reports the causality test by a simultaneous
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equation system. Finally, Section 8 concludes.
2 Literature review and hypotheses
This study closely relates to three strands of literature: short sales, corporate cash holdings,
and the real effects of financial markets. Actions in financial markets can significantly affect
real economic activities due to the informativeness of security prices (Bond, Edmans, and
Goldstein, 2012). This idea can go back to Hayek (1945). Dow and Gorton (1997) develop
a model to demonstrate that information in stock prices affects investment decisions.
Subruhmanyam and Titman (1999) demonstrate that the going-public decision is affected
by stock price efficiency. There is also empirical evidence for the real effects of financial
markets. Chen, Goldstein and Jiang (2007) find that stock price informativeness has
strong positive effects on the sensitivity of corporate investment to stock price. Fresard
(2012) demonstrates that stock price informativeness has positive effects on cash saving
sensitivity to stock price. Edmans, Goldstein, and Jiang (2012) find that stock price has
a strongly negative effect on takeover activity. Hau and Lai (2013) find that stock price
has a causal effect on corporate investment and employment. Goldstein, Ozdenoren, and
Yuan (2013) propose a theoretical model to illustrate trading frenzies in financial markets
and their impact on corporate capital providers’ decisions.
Short-selling activity in financial markets can improve stock price informativeness by
facilitating the incorporation of negative information into stock prices. There is evidence
that short sellers own super information, which can be private information or sophisticated
analyses based on public news (Engelberg, Reed, and Ringgenberg, 2012) that is not yet
incorporated into stock prices. Seneca (1967), Figlewski (1981), Figlewski and Webb
(1993), Dechow, Hutton, Meulbroek and Sloan (2001), and Desai, Ramesh, Thiagarajan,
and Balachandran (2002) all find evidence that stocks with higher short interest have
lower subsequent returns. Christophe, Ferri, and Angel (2004) find evidence of informed
trading in pre-announcement short selling. Pownall and Simko (2005) find that short sellers
function as information intermediaries covering the lower tail of earnings expectations.
Cohen, Diether, and Malloy (2007) find that short-sale demand leads to negative abnormal
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returns in the following month and that the short-selling market is an important mechanism
for revealing private information. Bris, Goetzmann, and Zhu (2007) find international
evidence that short selling facilitates the incorporation of negative information into stock
prices. Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang (2008) find evidence that short sellers are well informed
and that institutional, nonprogram short sales are the most informative. Karpoff and Lou
(2010) find that short sellers anticipate the eventual discovery (and severity) of financial
misconduct. Boehmer and Wu (2013) find that short selling stimulates the price discovery
process.
A high short interest is a negative signal for a firm, as argued by Diamond and Ver-
recchia (1987), and triggers additional concerns in financial markets. Furthermore, in
practice, after short sellers build up their short positions, they may aggressively spread
negative information among corporate stakeholders. For example, based on their research
investigations short sellers may publish negative news among investors or in the public
media to maximize the impact of negative information on the firm stock prices so that
they can make maximal profit quickly. Short-selling attacks can damage relationship with
stakeholders that are crucial for a firm’s survival and growth (Jensen, 2001; Titman, 1984;
Cornell and Shapiro, 1987; Subruhmanyam and Titman, 2001; Fee, Hadlock and Thomas,
2006; Kale and Shahrur, 2007; Banerjee, Dasgupta, and Kim, 2008; Almanzan, Suarez
and Titman, 2009; Bushee and Miller, 2012). Clearly, managers should not ignore short
sales in the financial markets when making corporate policies.
However, most research on short sales focuses on the relationship between the short
sale and stock return, while the impact of short sales on corporate policies has rarely been
investigated, with the exception of Grullon, Michenaud, and Weston (2012), who find that
an increase in short-selling activity reduces equity financing and investment by lowering
stock prices. This paper focuses on the effect of short selling on corporate cash holdings.
A fundamental target in research on cash holding is to understand why firms hold
so much cash given the relatively low rate of return. Bates, Kahle and Stulz (2009)
demonstrate that on average, US industrial firms more than doubled their cash holdings
from 1980 to 2006 and held cash worth more than 20% of their total assets from 2000 to
2006. Corporate cash holdings may be driven by different motives, including transaction
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motives (Baumol, 1952; Miller and Orr, 1966; Mulligan, 1997), tax motives (Foley, Hartzell,
Titman, and Twite, 2007), agency motives (Jensen, 1986; Dittmar, Mahrt-Smith, and
Servaes, 2003; Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith, 2007; Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson, 2006;
Harford, Mansi, and Maxwell, 2008; Chava and Purnanandam, 2010; Liu and Mauer,
2011), and precautionary motives.
Firms may have unexpected and urgent liquidity requirements, such as for an invest-
ment opportunity requiring quick actions (Huberman, 1984), or corporate crisis manage-
ment during negative events2. However, the external financing may be expensive or per-
haps not even available when firms face urgent liquidity support. This concern motivates
firms to hold cash. Keynes (1936) describes this motive as precautionary motive. The
following studies offer significant support for the precautionary motives for cash holdings.
Almazan, Motta, Titman, and Uysal (2010) find firms located within an industry clus-
ter have more acquisition opportunities and maintain more financial slack; Kim, Mauer
and Sherman (1998) demonstrate that optimal liquidity increases with the variance of fu-
ture cash flows; Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz and Williamson (1999) find that firms with strong
growth opportunities and riskier cash flows hold more cash; Almeida, Campello, and Weis-
bach (2004) find that financially constrained firms have positive cash flow sensitivity of
cash; Han and Qiu (2007) show that the cash holdings of financially constrained firms are
sensitive to cash flow volatility because of precautionary motives; McLean (2011) finds
firms increasingly issue shares for cash savings because of increasing precautionary mo-
tives; Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2009) find that cash holdings increase as cash flows become
riskier and that precautionary motives play an important role; and Acharya, Davydenko,
and Strebulaev (2012) find that cash savings are positively correlated with credit spreads
and that precautionary savings are central to understanding this relation.
The concerns of precautionary motives are further specified in the literature. For ex-
ample, Acharya, Almeida, and Campello (2007) find that the correlation between future
investment opportunities and cash flows affects corporate cash policy. Palazzo (2012)
2For example, on Nov. 15, 2011, Sino-Forest released the investigation findings of the Independent
Committee to deny the allegation of fraud. The investigation started on the same day of Muddy Waters
report. “Taking into account advisor costs, the Company has incurred costs of approximately $35 million
to date on the work of the Independent Committee and matters arising as a result of the MW Report”
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demonstrates firms with a higher correlation between cash flows and the aggregate shock
are more likely to have higher optimal cash savings. Baskin (1987), Haushalter, Klasa,
and Maxwell (2007), Fresard (2010), Fresard and Valta (2012), and Hoberg, Phillips and
Prabhala (2012) all study the relationship between cash holdings and competition in prod-
uct markets, and Ruchin (2010) finds that corporate diversification decreases cash savings
because of lower cross-divisional correlations in investment opportunities. What is the
concern of managers with respect to short selling? The answer is found in the correlation
between the distress of negative events and short selling attacks in financial markets. Short
sellers chase negative events and attempt to depress stock prices to maximize profits. The
negative information spread among stakeholders by short sellers, coupled with a slumping
stock price, may deter potential capital providers (Goldstein, Ozdenoren, and Yuan, 2013)
or trigger negative domino effects among non-financial stakeholders (Subruhmanyam and
Titman, 2001), which exacerbates financial distress as a catalyst in negative events. Ac-
cording to the precautionary motives of cash holdings, managers should hoard more cash
when short-selling pressure is high in stock markets.
Furthermore, the heterogeneity of firm characteristics affects the sensitivity of cash
holding to short selling. For example, firms with volatile performances tend to have
weaker relationships with stakeholder and are more vulnerable to short-selling attacks.
Firms with significant business risk might have instruments other than cash to hedge.
But in practice, many risks are not hedgeable, thus requiring firms to hold cash (Bates,
Kahle and Stulz, 2009). R&D activities may also affect the strength of the short-sale
impact. R&D expenditures have increased sharply in recent decades. Brown and Petersen
(2011) find that firms use cash reserves to smooth their R&D expenditures because R&D
investment is risky and the adjustment cost is high. When a firm in trouble faces finan-
cial constraints, it must survive today and suspend investments for the future (e.g. cut
R&D expenditures). Moreover, when R&D projects are suspended, previous expenditures
would become useless sunk costs. Worse yet, relevant experts performing R&D may move
to competitors. Therefore, R&D-intensive firms should be more sensitive to short-selling
activity.
In practice, facing attacks from short sellers, firms’ blockholders and managers may
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choose to fight back. Khanna and Mathews (2012) study the incentives of blockholders to
protect the value of their stake from short-selling attacks by trading against short sellers.
Lamont (2012) studies the battles between short sellers and firms and posits that “firms
use a variety of methods to impede short selling, including legal threats, investigations,
lawsuits, and various technical actions intended to create a short squeeze. These actions
create short sale constraints.” A sufficient amount of cash is a strong signal for financial
health, and such resources solidify stakeholder confidence and provide liquidity support to
defend stock prices.
The theoretical and empirical research on short sales and cash holdings suggests the
following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1 Short-selling activity in financial markets has a positive impact on
corporate cash holdings; a firm’s business risk and R&D expenses strengthen this impact,
which is consistent with precautionary motives of cash holdings.
Short sales are typically implemented under certain constraints, particularly in bearish
markets. For example, the uptick rule was introduced in the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 as Rule 10a-1 and implemented in 1938.3 Almazan, Brown, Carlson and Chapman
(2004) find that approximately 70% mutual funds are not allowed to short sell. Miller
(1977) proposes that stocks with high divergence of opinions and short-sale constraints
tend to be overpriced because only the most optimistic opinions are expressed freely in the
pricing. Jones and Lamont (2002), Duffie, Garleanu and Pedersen (2002), Asquith, Pathak
and Ritter (2005), Boehme, Danielsen, and Sorescu (2006) and Berkman, Dimitrov, Jain,
Koch, and Tice (2009) find that stocks with short-sale constraints have lower subsequent
returns. Short sale constraints should alleviate short-sale pressures and weaken the pre-
cautionary motives of cash holdings. In literature, institutional ownership is a prevalent
measure of fewer short-sale constraints (Asquith, Pathak and Ritter, 2005; Nagel, 2005).
Thus, the second hypothesis related to short-sale constraints and cash holdings is as fol-
lows:
3The SEC eliminated uptick rule on July 6, 2007. However, facing the political and public pressure,
the SEC adopted an alternative uptick rule as Rule 201 on Feb. 24, 2010 (SEC release 2010-26).
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Hypothesis 2 Institutional ownership has a positive impact on precautionary cash
holdings because high institutional ownership indicates fewer short-sale constraints; more-
over, high divergence of investors’ opinions strengthens this impact on cash holdings.
Notably, institutional ownership may affect cash holdings through mechanisms other
than short sales. For example, institutional investors may actively monitor corporate
management and improve corporate governance. Better governance increases the value
of cash (Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith, 2007) and optimal cash holdings. Large institutional
shareholders should be the main source of this outside monitoring (Shleifer and Vishny,
1986; Carleton, Nelson, and Weisbach, 1998). Holderness (2003) offers a thorough survey
of blockholders in corporate governance. Another explanation for the impact of institu-
tional ownership is related to the active trading of institutional investors. Brown, Chen,
and Shekhar (2011) find that ownership by short-term institutions, which trade more
frequently, increases corporate cash holdings. These alternative mechanisms will be dis-
entangled from the short-sale mechanism in this study. Thus, the third hypothesis is as
follows:
Hypothesis 3 As a proxy for the supply of short-sale equity loans, institutional own-
ership has a positive impact on cash holding after controlling for the ownership of block-
holders and investors’ holding horizons. Furthermore, this positive impact is amplified in
firms with relatively more short-term investors because such firms have weaker connections
with shareholders and are more vulnerable to short-selling attacks.
3 Data and variables
The sample in this study includes data from comprehensive sources. Corporate annual
accounting data are from CRSP-COMPUSTAT Merged. Daily and monthly stock data
are from CRSP. High-frequency intra-day stock data are from TAQ. Short-interest data
are from Bloomberg (from 1992). Analysts related information is from IBES. Institutional
holding data are from Thomson Reuters (13f). Fama-French factors are from Kenneth
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French’s website4. The sample excludes financial firms (SIC code 6000 to 6999) and utility
firms (SIC code 4900 to 4999). Only firms with positive total assets, positive sales, and
leverage5 between 0 and 1 were considered. Only firms with common stocks traded in
NYSE, AMEX or NASDAQ were considered. Companies with stock that was traded fewer
than 100 days in a fiscal year or that changed exchanges during the year were excluded.
Stocks with prices more than US$ 999 per share were excluded. The sample begins in
1992 because of the availability of short-interest data, and the sample ends in 2010.
Cash holding is measured by the ratio of cash and short-term investment (CHE) over
the book value of total assets (AT) in each fiscal year6. Short sale is studied from both the
demand and supply sides. The demand side of short sales is measured by the Short interest-
ratio, which is the ratio of short interest over shares outstanding and directly reflects the
short-selling activities in the market. Theoretically, short interest describes the intersection
of short-sale demand and supply and could not simply be used to measure short demand,
i.e., it measures demand only if the supply of short sales is not bound. Fortunately, in
practice short-selling constraints are unlikely for the overwhelming majority of stocks, as
shown in Asquith, Pathak, and Ritter (2005). In this study, the Short-interest ratio is
winsorized at the top percentile each year, which makes it more reliable as a measure of
short-sale demand. Furthermore, an extremely high short-interest ratio indicates that the
negative event has been very serious and the firm may have consumed the cash holdings but
be unable to re-accumulate cash savings at that moment, as described by the suggestive
evidence of Goldstein, Ozdenoren, and Yuan (2013). Therefore, the winsorization of Short-
interest ratio alleviates the contamination of the relationship between short sales and cash
policy caused by firms with extremely high Short-interest ratio. The short-interest data
are available in a monthly or semi-monthly frequency7. The ratios are first calculated in
the corresponding frequency, and the annual Short interest ratio is then calculated as the
4http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/index.html. Thanks Fama and French for
making the data publicly available.
5Total debt divided by total assets (AT), where total debt is long-term debt (DLTT) plus debt in
current liabilities (DLC).
6The abbreviations in capital letter are the variable names in the dataset CRSP-Compustat Merged.
7On March 6, 2007, the SEC approved amendments to Rule 3360 that increase the frequency of short
interest reporting from monthly to twice a month. See details in SEC release No. 34-55406. The new rule
was effective on September 7, 2007.
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average of the monthly or semi-monthly ratios during that fiscal year.
The supply side of short sales is studied through Institutional ownership. The stock
is easier to borrow, and short sellers face fewer constraints as the share of stock held by
institutional investor increases, ceteris paribus. Institutional ownership is measured by
the ratio of shares held by institutional investors over shares outstanding. Institutional
ownership is originally calculated as the fraction of shares held by institutions in a quarterly
frequency. Institutional ownership above one is not considered. If there is no holding
data in Thomson Reuters (13f), the Institutional ownership is set to zero. The annual
Institutional ownership is the average quarterly institutional ownership across that fiscal
year.
The two remaining variables relevant to institutional investors are Blockholder owner-
ship and Institutional turnover. Blockholder ownership is used to disentangle institutional
governance incentives from short-selling concerns. Blockholders are defined as institu-
tions that own more than 5% of a firm’s shares. Blockholder ownership is the ratio of
total holdings of blockholders over shares outstanding. It is initially calculated at a quar-
terly frequency and then averaged across the fiscal year for the annual rate. Institutional
turnover is a measure for the institutional investment horizon, which is controlled for the
effect of institutional trading frequency on cash holdings. The construction of Institutional
turnover follows Gaspar, Massa, and Matos (2005) and Yan and Zhang (2009) and details
are in Appendix 1.
Two variables are related to financial analysts. One of the variables is the Analyst
coverage, which is a proxy for an alternative information source and is calculated as the
logarithm of one plus the number of IBES analysts who provide fiscal year one earnings
estimates. The other is Divergence of opinion, the analysts’ forecasts dispersion follow-
ing Diether, Malloy, and Scherbina (2002) and Garfinkel (2009). It is calculated as the
standard deviation of earnings forecasts scaled by the absolute value of the mean earnings
forecast. Both Analyst coverage and Divergence of opinion are initially calculated in each
month, and then, the annual variables are obtained by taking the average over that fiscal
year.
Two variables are related to firms’ cash flow risk. The first is Industry cash flow
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volatility, following Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2009) who denote it as Industry sigma. For
each firm-year, compute the standard deviation of cash flow to assets for the previous
10 years; at least three observations are required for the calculations. Industry cash flow
volatility is then calculated as the average of firm cash flow standard deviations across
each two-digit SIC code. The other variable is Operating income volatility (Zhang, 2006;
Berkman, Dimitrov, Jain, Koch, and Tice, 2009; Fang, Noe, and Tice, 2009), which is
calculated for each firm in one year as the standard deviation of quarterly operating income
before depreciation divided by the quarterly book value of assets across the 20 quarters
prior to the fiscal year end. A minimum of eight quarterly observations per firm is required.
Firms in the same industry share the identical Industry cash flow volatility, whereas each
firm has its own Operating income volatility. However, Industry cash flow volatility is
available for more firms than Operating income volatility because of the restriction on
the number of observations in the calculations. Following Bates, Kahle and Stulz (2009),
Industry cash flow volatility will be used in the basic regressions. Operating income
volatility will be used in the tests that emphasize the heterogeneity of firms. In fact, the
two measures of cash flow risk have similar effects on cash holdings, which is consistent
with precautionary motives for cash holding.
Idiosyncratic risk, also called firm-specific risk, may affect short sellers’ decisions. Pon-
tiff (2006) and Duan, Hu, and McLean (2010) find evidence that idiosyncratic risk increases
the cost of arbitrage and defers short-selling activity. However, it is also possible that high
idiosyncratic risk make a firm more vulnerable to short-selling attacks. It improves short
sellers’ profit expectations conditional on the negative information. Therefore, idiosyn-
cratic risk is included as a factor that impacts short interest in the simultaneous equation
system for the causality test. Following Fu (2009) idiosyncratic risk is estimated by an
exponential GARCH model, which is also used by Brockman, Schutte and Yu (2009),
Spiegel and Wang (2006), and Eiling (2013), by regressing the monthly stock return on
the Fama-French three factors; Idiosyncratic risk is calculated as the square root of the
conditional variance of the error term.
Stock liquidity is used to measure how easily information can be spread through stock
markets. Nyborg and Wang (2013) find that stock liquidity has a positive impact on
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cash holding. Two standard measures of stock liquidity are used in this study. One is
Acharya and Pedersen’s (2005) modified version of the original Amihud illiquidity measure.
Goyenko, Holden, and Trzcinka (2009) suggest that Amihud measure does well as a price
impact measure. Following Acharya and Pedersen (2005), the original Amihud measure is
revised for concerns regarding the effects of inflation over a long time period and extreme
values. It is calculated as follows:
Illiqi,t = min (0.25 + 0.30 · Illiq Amihudi,t · PMt−1, 30.00),
where PMt−1 is the ratio of the capitalizations of the market portfolio at the end of the pre-
vious fiscal year and of the market portfolio at the end of July 1962. And Illiq Amihudi,t
in the formula above is the original annual illiquidity measure for firm i in year t as in
Amihud (2002):
Illiq Amihudi,t =
1
N
N∑
d=1
|ri,t,d|
DV oli,t,d
,
where ri,t,d is stock return on day d in year t, DV oli,t,d is the dollar trading volume (in
million dollars) on day d in year t, and N is the number of trading days in year t. For
stocks in NASDAQ, the trading volume faces double counting and intra-dealer problem. As
suggested by Atkins and Dyl (1997) and Nagel (2005b), trading volumes in NASDAQ are
adjusted by multiplying 0.5. Furthermore, following Nyborg and Ostberg (2011), exclude
the daily CRSP observations with negative price on either day d or d−1 and a zero return
on day d because this indicates stale prices and spurious volume. Therefore, this liquidity
measure is the adjusted version of the original Amihud (2002) measure following Acharya
and Pedersen (2005).
The other stock liquidity measure is the logarithm of the relative effective bid-ask
spread (Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam, 2001, Fang, Noe, and Tice, 2009) calculated
using TAQ. The effective spread is defined as the difference between the execution price
and the mid-point of the prevailing bid-ask quote. Then relative effective bid-ask spread
is the effective spread divided by the mid-point of the prevailing bid-ask quote.
Using TAQ, the calculation is proceeded in the usual way as follows: to compute the
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relative effective bid ask spread, Quotes established before the opening of the market or
after the close of the market are excluded. Quotes are also discarded if the offer price
is lower than the bid price. The trade record is excluded if it does not have positive a
price or trading size. The Lee and Ready (1991) algorithm is then used to match trades
and quotes: for a trade between 1993 and 1998, the five-second rule is used; for a trade
between 1999 and 2010, the trade is matched to the first quote before the trade. The
same matching methodology is used by Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2008) and
Fang, Noe, and Tice (2009). To eliminate potential errors in trades and quotes, following
Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2001), after the matching process, the observations
which satisfy the following four conditions were excluded:
1. QuotedSpread > $5;
2. EffectiveSpread/QuotedSpread > 4.0;
3. RelativeEffectiveSpread/RelativeQuotedSpread > 4.0;
4. QuotedSpread/TransactionPrice > 0.4,
where RelativeEffectiveSpread and EffectiveSpread are relative effective bid-ask spread and
effective spread defined above, QuotedSpread is the difference between prevailing quoted
bid and ask, and the RelativeQuotedSpread is QuotedSpread divided by the mid-point of the
corresponding quoted bid and ask. The daily relative effective bid-ask spread is calculated
by taking arithmetic mean of the transaction-level relative effective bid-ask spread on one
trading day. The annual relative effective bid-ask spread is the average of daily relative
effective bid-ask spread within the corresponding fiscal year. Following Fang, Noe, and
Tice (2009), the logarithm of the annual relative effective bid-ask spread (Log resprd) is
used because of the normality concern.
Other control variables follow those in Bates, Kahle and Stulz (2009), including Firm
size, Leverage, Market-to-book ratio (MTB), Net equity issuance, Net debt issuance, Cash
flow, Net working capital, R&D expenditure, Capital expenditure, Acquisition, Dividend
dummy, and IPO dummies. The definitions of these control variables are in Appendix 1.
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The sample is winsorized as follows. R&D, Acquisition, Capital expenditure, and
Industry cash flow risk are winsorized on both sides at 1%. Equity beta8 is winsorized on
both sides at 0.5%. Net working capital and Cash flow are winsorized from bottom at 1%.
MTB and Short-interest ratio are winsorized from top at 1%. It leaves 31, 545 firm-years
observations.
Insert Table 1 here.
Table 1 reports the statistics of the variables in the sample. The sample period is from
1992 through 2010. An average firm in the sample holds cash that measures up to 19% of
its total assets, which is consistent with the high cash ratios presented in Bates, Kahle, and
Stulz (2009). The median of short interest is 1%, and the institutional ownership medians
are many-fold greater than the short interest medians. These findings are consistent with
those of Asquith, Pathak and Ritter (2005) and justify the short-interest ratio as an
appropriate proxy for short-sale demand.
Insert Table 2 here.
Table 2 presents the correlation matrix of variables. The correlation between Cash
ratio and Short-interest ratio is significantly positive, with a Pearson correlation of 0.16
and a Spearman rank correlation of 0.21. These results are consistent with the precau-
tionary motives of cash holdings. The correlation coefficients between Cash ratio and
certain firm characteristics, including Firm size, Leverage, MTB, Industry cash flow risk,
Net equity issuance, R&D, Net working capital, Capital expenditure, Acquisition, Div-
idend dummy and IPO dummies, are consistent with the findings in Bates, Kahle, and
Stulz (2009). Table 2 indicates negative correlations between cash ratio and Institutional
ownership, Net debt issuance, and Analyst coverage. These counter-intuitive correlations
may be caused by hidden firm characteristics, such as Firm size. As a stylized fact, cash
holding is negatively associated with firm size. Moreover, Institutional ownership, Net
debt issuance, and Analyst coverage are positively correlated with firm size, as shown in
Table 2. Therefore, those correlations may not reflect the actual relations between Cash
8Annual Scholes-Williams (1977) equity beta is downloaded from CRSP. Equity beta will be used in
the causality test as a regressor for Short interest ratio in equation (4).
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and Institutional ownership, Net debt issuance, and Analyst coverage. In the following
sections, the relationship between cash holdings and relevant factors will be investigated
through multivariate regression analysis.
4 Short interest: the demand side of short sales
This section studies the relationship between cash holdings and short-sale demand, which
is measured by Short-interest ratio. A high Short-interest ratio indicates the short sellers’
intense attention and is a negative signal to the firm. Managers can learn from this signal
and must concern themselves with how stakeholders’ reactions affect stock prices and firm
business operations. For example, a high short-interest ratio may trigger the concerns of
rating agencies and loan providers, which would affect the cost of debt financing; suppliers
may become reluctant to provide trade credit, and potential customers may reconsider
whether they should buy products. Corporate policies, such as the cash policy, may be
affected by the short interest in the market. Consistent with precautionary motives of cash
holdings, Short-interest ratio should have a positive impact on cash holdings, as posited
in Hypothesis 1.
4.1 Basic regressions
The first part of Hypothesis 1 is tested by the following specification.
Cash ratioi,t = Intercept+ Short interest ratioi,t−1 + Firm sizei,t + Leveragei,t
+MTBi,t + Industry cash flow riski,t−1 +Net equity issuancei,t
+Net debt issuancei,t + Cash flowi,t +Net working capitali,t
+R&Di,t + Capital expenditurei,t + Acquisitioni,t
+Dividend dummyi,t + IPO dummiesi,t + εi,t,
(1)
where i refers to a firm and t refers to a year. Both Short-interest ratio and Industry cash
flow risk are lagged for one year to address the precautionary motives for cash holding and
the endogeneity concern.
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Insert Table 3 here.
The regression results are provided in columns (2) to (4) in Table 3. Three different
estimators are used for robustness purpose. Column (2) presents the results of Fama-
MacBeth (1973) estimator. The t-values in Fama-MacBeth estimators are calculated based
on Newey-West (1987) standard errors. Column (3) provides the results of OLS clustering
in both firm and year dimensions. The t-values for the firm-year clustered estimator are
based on the two-dimensional standard error proposed in Petersen (2009). Column (4)
provides the results of the firm and industry fixed-effects estimator. The t-values for the
industry-year fixed effects estimator are adjusted for heteroskedasticity by firm cluster,
and Fama-French 48-industry categories are used for industry classification.
The impact of the short-interest ratio is positively significant and consistent in all three
estimators. On average, a 1% increase in the Short-interest ratio in the market from the
previous year results in an approximately 0.44% increase in Cash ratio. Relatively, if the
Short-interest ratio increases from the first quartile to the third quartile, the Cash ratio
increases by 1.5%.9 The coefficients of the control variables, such as Firm size, Leverage,
Net working capital, Net debt issuance, Net equity issuance, are all consistent with the
results in Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2009)10.
4.2 Further evidence: operating income volatility and R&D ex-
penses
The heterogeneity of firm characteristics can affect the impact of short-selling activity on
cash holdings, as stated in the second part of Hypothesis 1. One characteristic is firm’s
business risk, which is measured by Operating income volatility. Firms with riskier business
are more likely to have extreme cash flows. Therefore, a negative signal is more likely to
indicate an extreme loss. Learning from the negative signal sent by short sellers, corporate
9The first quartile of Short-interest ratio is 0.002 and the third quartile is 0.035. Then 1.5% ≈[
1
3
· (0.469 + 0.435 + 0.425)
]
× (0.035− 0.002).
10The only exception is Industry cash flow risk in industry and year fixed effect estimator. The coefficient
is still positive but not significant. The reason is that Industry cash flow risk is defined at an industry
level, whereas industry dummies absorb the effect and make the industry level risk measure insignificant.
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stakeholders, such as capital providers, suppliers, and customers, have less confidence in
the firm’s performance and are more likely to weaken or even terminate their relationships
with the firm. Thus this concern must strengthen the firm’s precautionary motives for cash
holding. The other firm characteristic is R&D expense. Successful R&D projects generate
investment opportunities and help the firm maintain a competitive advantage among peers.
Liquidity shortages will make R&D-intensive firms suffer considerably because the previous
expenses becomes sunk cost and expert researchers may move to competitors.
To test the amplifying effect of firm business risk (R&D expense), the intersection term
between Operating income volatility (R&D) and Short-interest ratio is added on the right
side of Specification (1):
Cash ratio = Intercept+ Amplifier × Short-interest ratio+ Amplifier
+Short-interest ratio+ Controls+ ,
where Amplifier is Operating income volatility or R&D. The intersection term Amplifier×
Short-interest ratio is expect to be significantly positive.
The results of the tests are presented in Columns (5) to (10) of Table 3. Columns
(5) to (7) are the results for Operating income volatility, and Columns (8) to (10) are
the results for R&D. In Columns (5) to (7), the coefficients of the intersection term
Operating income volatility×Short-interest ratio are all significantly positive. The am-
plifying effect is also economically meaningful. For example, in the Fama-MacBeth (1973)
estimator, if the Operating income volatility increases from the first quartile to the third
quartile, the impact of Short-interest ratio is amplified by 40.2%.11 This evidence strongly
supports the hypothesis that short-selling activities affect cash holding through the pre-
cautionary motive of cash holding.
Columns (8) to (10) in Table 3 demonstrate that the coefficients of the intersection
term R&D×Short-interest ratio are all significantly positive, which indicates that firms’
R&D expenses amplify the impact of short selling on cash holdings. In the Fama-MacBeth
11The first quartile of Operating income volatility is 0.01 and the third quartile is 0.03. The amplifying
effect 40.2% ≈ 7.543 × (0.03 − 0.01)/(0.300 + 7.543 × 0.01). Correspondingly, the firm and year cluster
estimator shows the amplifying effect as 42.9% and the fixed-effect estimator shows the amplifying effect
as 42.5%.
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(firm and year clustered OLS, industry and year fixed-effects) estimator, when the R&D
expense increases from the first quartile (0.00) to the third quartile (0.06), the impact of
short selling on cash holdings is amplified by 31.8% (38.0% and 34.6%, respectively).
This section presents the supportive empirical results for the test of Hypothesis 1. The
evidence indicates that short-sale demand in the market has a positive impact on corporate
cash holdings, particularly for firms that are vulnerable to negative information. High-
business-risk and R&D-intensive firms are more fragile regarding short-selling activity in
the market, leading the cash holdings of these firms to be more sensitive to short selling.
5 Institutional ownership: the supply side of short
sales
This section studies the relationship between cash holdings and short-sale constraints,
which is measured by Institutional ownership. Higher Institutional ownership indicates
fewer short-sale constraints which leads to higher cash holdings as posited in Hypothesis
2.
When managers see the real threats from short sellers in the market, it is intuitive
for them to accumulate more cash, as demonstrated in the previous section. The concern
about short selling may not be limited to the actual short sale demand. When the cash
policy is formulated, precautionary motives make firms prepare cash savings for future
negative scenarios. The supposed negative scenarios may not currently be a real problem,
and the short sellers may not have started their attacks, which means that short interest
in the market may not be high at the time. However, short sellers have strong motivations
to expose negative information about firms, and they tend to appear very quickly after
negative events start. The difficulty in negative scenarios is likely to be underestimated if
the role of short sellers is ignored. Therefore, when making cash policy, it is reasonable to
consider the impact of possible short sales in negative scenarios. As the supply of equity
loan increases, there will be fewer short constraints, and more aggressive short-selling
attacks.
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Before testing Hypothesis 2, the relationship between cash holding and short-sale
demand-supply is intuitively illustrated as follows. First, divide the firms into four by
four groups based on the demand and supply of short sales independently, and then,
calculate the average cash ratios within each group of demand-supply combination.
Note that Firm size is highly correlated with both Institutional ownership and Cash
ratio. The correlation between Firm size and Institutional ownership is 0.43 and correlation
between Firm size and Cash ratio is −0.37. Grouping the firms by institutional ownership
would be similar to grouping by Firm size; the relationship between cash holding and
institutional ownership would be distorted because high institutional ownership is expected
to have a positive impact cash holding, whereas the size effect on cash holding may hide
this impact. To purge the size effect, Institutional ownership is de-sized and the residual
is used in grouping. The de-sizing procedure follows Nagel (2005).12 To be consistent,
the same procedure is also run for Short-interest ratio even if the size effect may not be a
concern for it. In each year, the firms are divided into 16 groups by the respective quartile
breakpoints of lagged residual Institutional ownership and lagged residual Short-interest
ratio.
Insert Table 4 here.
Table 4 presents the average Cash ratios of these 16 groups. The table demonstrates
clear increasing trends of Cash ratios along both the demand and supply dimensions. Given
the demand for short sale, high supply of equity loans loosens short-sale constraints, and
potential threats from short sellers are high. It strengthens the precautionary motive of
cash holdings, particularly for firms with high Short-interest ratios. In the top quartile
group of the Short-interest ratio, Cash ratio is monotonically increasing along the supply
dimension. And the average Cash ratio in the top quartile of Institutional ownership is
8.5% higher than that in the bottom quartile. In fact, differences of means between the
12Firstly, Institutional ownership (Inst. Own.) is mapped from an interval between zero and one to the
real line by a logit transformation: logit(Inst. Own.) = log
(
Inst. Own.
1−Inst. Own.
)
, where values of Institutional
ownership below 0.0001 and above 0.9999 are replaced with 0.0001 and 0.9999 respectively. Secondly,
regress the truncated Institutional ownership on Firm size and square of Firm size in each year to get
the residual institutional ownership. The square term of Firm size is set to capture the nonlinear relation
between Institutional ownership and Firm size.
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top and bottom quartile groups are all significantly positive, as shown in Column “4-1 ”
with corresponding t-statistics. Similarly, given the supply of equity loans for short sales,
the increasing trend along columns illustrates that Cash ratios increase with short-sale
demand in the market, which is consistent with the results in the previous section.
5.1 Baseline regressions
The first part of Hypothesis 2 is tested by the following specification.
Cash ratioi,t = Intercept+ Inst. Own.i,t−1 + Firm sizei,t + Leveragei,t
+MTBi,t + Industry cash flow riski,t−1 +Net equity issuancei,t
+Net debt issuancei,t + Cash flowi,t +Net working capitali,t
+R&Di,t + Capital expenditurei,t + Acquisitioni,t
+Dividend dummyi,t + IPO dummiesi,t + εi,t,
(2)
where Inst. Own.i,t−1 refers to the institutional ownership of firm i in previous year. The
lagged Institutional ownership is used to capture precautionary motives for cash holding
and alleviate the endogeneity concern. As posited in Hypothesis 2, the coefficient of
Inst. Own.i,t−1 is expected to be significantly positive, which indicates the positive effect
of short-sale supply on cash holdings.
Insert Table 5 here.
Table 5 presents the regression results. Columns (2) to (4) are the Fama-MacBeth,
firm and year clustered OLS, and industry and year fixed-effect estimators of Specification
(2). The coefficients of Inst. Own.i,t−1 are all significantly positive, as expected. The
average coefficient of the three estimators is 0.063, which indicates that if Institutional
ownership increases from the first quartile to the third quartile, the Cash ratio increases
by 3.3%.13 The coefficients of the control variables are consistent with those in Bates,
Kahle, and Stulz (2009). To observe how the demand and supply of short sales compete
for the effects on cash holdings, the lag of Short-interest ratio, which was used as a proxy
13The first quartile of Institutional ownership is 0.186, and the third quartile is 0.707. Then 3.3% ≈
(0.707− 0.186)× 0.063.
80
for short-sale demand in the previous section, is added to the right side of Specification
(2). The regression results are presented in Columns (5) to (7) of Table 5.
The coefficients of Institutional ownership and Short-interest ratio are all significantly
positive. These results indicates that both the real threats of short sales in the market and
the potential threats in future negative scenario have a positive effect on precautionary
cash holdings. The coefficients of Institutional ownership become slightly smaller than the
corresponding coefficients in Columns (2) to (4) in Table 5. Similarly, the coefficients of
Short-interest ratio also become a little smaller than those in Columns (2) to (4) in Table
3, in which only the demand of short sales is considered, which indicates that the effect on
cash holdings is shared by the concern of the real short sale threats and the potential for
short-sale threats. When comparing the coefficients of Institutional ownership and Short-
interest ratio, we can observe that the absolute effect of the real threat of short sales in the
market is approximately nine times as strong as that of potential threats, which indicates
that firms react much more seriously to short-selling pressure in the market than to the
potential threat in the “imagined” negative scenarios. However, in practice the value of
Institutional ownership is much larger than that of Short-interest ratio. According to the
results in Columns (5) to (7) in Table 5, if Institutional ownership increases from the first
quartile to the third quartile, Cash ratio increases by 2.24%; in contrast, if Short interest
ratio increases from the first quartile to the third quartile, Cash ratio increases only 1.24%,
which indicates that the effect of the short-sale supply is not as weak as it may appear.
Divergence of opinion measures the difference between pessimistic and optimistic in-
vestors. High divergence of opinion indicates that pessimistic investors have strong motives
to short sell the stock. As stated by the second part of Hypothesis 2, high divergence of
option should strengthen the impact of short-sale supply on cash holdings. This part of
Hypothesis 2 is tested by the following specification.
Cash ratioi,t = Intercept+ Inst. Own.i,t−1 ×Div. Op. Dum.i,t−1
+Inst. Own.i,t−1 +Div. Op. Dum.i,t−1 + Controls+ i,t,
where the dummy variable Div. Op. Dum. takes a value of one for Divergence of opinion
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in the top quartile, and a value of zero for Divergence of opinion in the bottom quartile.
The control variables are identical to those in Specification (2). Both Inst. Own. and
Div. Op. Dum. are lagged to capture the precautionary motives of cash holdings. The
coefficient of the intersection term Inst. Own.i,t−1×Div. Op. Dum.i,t−1 is the key indicator
for the test. A positive coefficient of the intersection term supports that Divergence of
opinion amplifies the effect of Institutional ownership on Cash ratio because of concerns
about short sales.
Insert Table 6 here.
Table 6 presents the results. Columns (2) to (4) provide the coefficients in the Fama-
MacBeth, firm and year clustering, and industry and year fixed-effects estimators respec-
tively. All coefficients of the intersection term are significantly positive, which indicates
that the effect of Institutional ownership on Cash ratio is stronger for firms with higher
Divergence of opinion. For example, in the Fama-MacBeth estimator, the effect of Insti-
tutional ownership on Cash ratio in the top quartile of Divergence of opinion is three time
greater than in bottom quartile14, which strongly supports the second part of Hypothesis
2.
5.2 Alternative explanations: governance incentives and investors’
holding horizons
There are other explanations for why institutional ownership may affect cash policies. For
example, high institutional ownership may lead to better governance because institutions
may be actively involved in corporate governance. Better governance improves the value
of cash and might increase the optimal amount of cash holdings. As we know, not all
institutional investors actively monitor firms. For example, small shareholders may be
free-riders in corporate governance, and only large shareholders have strong incentives
to monitor the firms. To disentangle the possible “better governance” effect from the
“short-sale threat” effect, Blockholder ownership is controlled as a proxy for institutional
14For firms in top quartile of Divergence of opinion, the effect of Institutional ownership is
(0.045+0.021=0.066), while in bottom quartile the effect is only 0.021.
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governance incentives. A blockholder is defined as an institutional investor who holds at
least 5% of a firm’s shares. Blockholder ownership is the sum of holdings of all blockholders
divided by share outstanding. The specification is as follows.
Cash ratioi,t = Intercept+ Inst. Own.i,t−1 +Block. Own.i,t−1 +Other Controls+ i,t,
where Block. Own. refers to Blockholder ownership and Other Controls includes the same
variables as the control variables in Specification (2). The regression results are listed in
Columns (5) to (7) in Table 6. The coefficients of Inst. Own. in all estimators continue to
be significantly positive after Blockholder ownership is controlled, which directly supports
Hypothesis 3. However, the coefficients of Block. Own. are all insignificant at the 10%
level, which does not support the argument that stronger governance incentive increases
cash holdings. One possible reason for this result is that the appearance of blockholders
indicates their strong connection with firms. During negative events, firms can rely on
supports from blockholders because it would be much more painful for blockholders to
sell their shares than for small shareholders. This intuition may ease the precautionary
motives of cash holding.
Another explanation for why institutional ownership affects cash policy relates to insti-
tutional trading activity. Institutional investors are professional and can actively rebalance
their portfolios in financial markets. However, intensive trading activity may make stock
prices more volatile, thus requiring firms to hold more cash because external financing can
be more expensive. However, not all institutional investors trade actively. For example,
short-term investors may hold the stocks for speculative purpose and trade the stocks more
frequently, whereas long-term investors may hold stocks for expected benefits from the in-
crease in firm value over the long run. To disentangle the “active-trading” mechanism, the
institutional investors’ holding horizon is considered in the analysis. The specification is
as follows.
Cash ratioi,t = Intercept+ Inst. Own.i,t−1 +Dum. Short-term inv.i,t−1
+Other Controls+ i,t,
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where Dum. Short-term inv. is a dummy variable, which takes a value of one for firms
with Institutional turnover above the median, and a value of zero for the remaining firms.
Other Controls includes the same variables as the control variables in Specification (2).
Furthermore, a firm with relatively more short-term investors tends to have weaker
relationship with its shareholders. When such a firm faces an attack from short sellers, it
is more likely to be abandoned by its shareholders, which indicates that short-sale threats
are intensified in such firms, as stated in Hypothesis 3. The specification is as follows.
Cash ratioi,t = Intercept+ Inst. Own.i,t−1 ×Dum. Short-term inv.i,t−1
+Inst. Own.i,t−1 +Dum. Short-term inv.i,t−1
+Other Controls+ i,t,
The key indicator of the specification is the intersection term Inst. Own. ×Dum. Short
-term inv., and a positive coefficient is expected for the amplification effect.
Columns (8) to (10) in Table 6 present the test results for the active-trading mecha-
nism in Hypothesis 3. The coefficients of Inst. Own. are significantly positive in all three
estimators after Dum. Short-term inv. is controlled in the regressions, which is consis-
tent with Hypothesis 3. Moreover, the coefficients of Dum. Short-term inv. are also
significantly positive in all three estimators, which supports the argument that shorter
investment horizons have a positive impact on cash holdings. These results indicate that
both short-sale supply and investment horizon positively affect cash holdings but through
different dimensions of precautionary motives. Columns (11) to (13) provide the test
results for the amplification effect in Hypothesis 3. The coefficients of intersection term
Inst. Own.×Dum. Short-term inv. are all significantly positive, which strongly supports
the amplification effect in Hypothesis 3. For example, in the Fama-MacBeth estimator,
the effect of short-sale supply on cash holdings of firms with relatively more short-term
investors is 1.65 times of that for remaining firms.
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6 Robustness test: Alternative information channels
This section investigates whether short-sale activity has unique impact on cash holdings
compared to other information channels. Stock liquidity facilitates the release of new
information and increases price informativeness, because it can lower transaction costs or
weaken the price impact of trading activities (Holmstrom and Tirole, 1993; Chordia, Roll
and Subrahmanyam, 2008; Collin-Dufresne and Fos, 2012). Stock liquidity strengthens
the firms’ concern for negative events and has a positive impact on cash holdings (Nyborg
and Wang, 2013). Another information channel is through financial analysts. A higher
analyst coverage means that firm’s performance is more transparent to the public, which
may affect corporate policies (Graham, Harvey and Rajgopal, 2005; Chang, Dasgupta, and
Hilary, 2006; Yu, 2008; Dyck, Morse, Zingales, 2010; Chang, 2011; Chen, Harford, and
Lin, 2012). Thus, it might be possible that these factors have similar effects on corporate
policies because they facilitate the diffusion of information regarding the same firms.
Compared to these two information channels, short selling has a special feature in
information diffusion because it particularly facilitates the spread of negative information,
which is essential to the precautionary motives of cash holdings. Negative information
owned by insiders may spread slowly. For example, insiders may own private information
but may be reluctant or not allowed to benefit by trading on negative information. There
may also be concerns regarding to the role of financial analysts. The agency problem of
analysts can lead to positive biases in their recommendations or earning forecasts (Dugar
and Nathan, 1995; Lin and McNichols, 1998; Michaely and Womack, 1999; Hong and
Kubik, 2003). In this section, a survival test is conducted. The specification for the race
is as follows.
Cash ratioi,t = Intercept+ Short insterest ratioi,t−1 + Stock liquidityi,t−1
+Analyst coveragei,t−1 + Controls+ i,t,
where stock liquidity is measured by adjusted Amihud illiquidity or by the logarithm
of the relative effective bid-ask spread (Log resprd), and Controls refer to the identical
control variables in Specification (1). To address the collinearity concern with firm size,
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following Nyborg and Wang (2013), stock liquidity measures and analyst coverage are also
residualized with respect to Firm size in each year. Results of tests with both initial and
residualized stock liquidity and analyst coverage are illustrated in Table 7.
Insert Table 7 here.
Columns (2) to (7) provide the results for the original liquidity measures and analyst
coverage. Columns (8) to (13) provide the results for the residual liquidity measures and
residual analyst coverage, which alleviates the collinearity concern. The coefficients of
Short insterest ratio are all significantly positive at the 1% level. This result is robust to
different econometric methodologies, different stock liquidity measures, and the concern
for collinearity, which indicates that short selling successfully survives in the test and has
its unique effect on cash holdings. Moreover, all coefficients of illiquidity are significantly
negative, which indicates that stock liquidity has a positive impact on cash holdings,
consistent with the findings of Nyborg and Wang (2013). The result for analyst coverage
is similar. All of the coefficients for analyst coverage are positive, which is consistent with
the argument that high analyst coverage makes firms more transparent to the public and
strengthens the precautionary motives of cash holdings.
The results in Table 7 demonstrate that these information channels have their own
special effects on corporate policy and cannot be entirely substituted by each other. Be-
cause new information can spread from these channels among stakeholders, managers must
consider the effect of these information channels when making corporate policies, such as
investment, financing, and cash policies. Managers are thus better monitored, which is
consistent with the monitoring roles of financial markets and financial analysts.
7 Causality test: simultaneous equation system
This section addresses the endogeneity concern through a simultaneous equation system
of cash holding and short sale. Endogeneity is an important issue in empirical research
(Roberts and Whited, 2012). The evidence in previous sections might be challenged by
reserve causality, i.e., it might be that cash holding affects short selling and not vice versa.
86
However, it appears unlikely that short sellers target firms with a large amount of cash.
A high cash ratio indicates that the firm is financially healthy. With sufficient liquidity
support, the firm has more options in defending its stock price against short-selling attacks,
which makes short sales more expensive and riskier. An alternative argument might be the
free cash flow problem (Jensen, 1986) because a high cash ratio might trigger the concern
that managers could waste the money in value-decreasing projects. However, it is better
for short sellers to act when the firm is spending its cash holdings inefficiently. The cash
holding is then consumed and the short sellers are thus actually targeting firms with less
cash.
In previous sections, the endogeneity concern is alleviated by using the lagged value
of short-sale proxies. In this section, further evidence for the causality is shown by the
following simultaneous equation system.
Cash ratiot = α0 +α1Short-interest ratiot +
∑
j=2
αjXj,t−1 + ηt (3)
Short-interest ratiot = β0 + β1Cash ratiot +
∑
k=2
βkZk,t−1 + ξt (4)
where Xj represents control variables in Equation (3) in which Cash ratio is the dependent
variable, and Zk represents control variables in Equation (4) in which Short-interest ratio
is the dependent variable. To test the endogeneity of cash holding and short selling,
contemporaneous values are used for Cash ratio and Short-interest ratio, and lagged values
are used for control variables. Considering the effect of industry, the Fama-French 48-
industry dummies are controlled in both equations of the system, but the coefficients of
industry dummies are not reported here. The key indicators of the causality test are the
signs and significance of α1 and β1, which are the coefficients of Short-interest ratio and
Cash ratio, respectively.
The control variables in Equation (3), Xj’s, includes the controls in Specification (1)
with Industry cash flow risk replaced by Operating income volatility. The control variables
in Equation (4), Zk’s, require some explanation. In Equation (4), Short-interest ratio rep-
resents the actual short-selling in the stock markets. When short sellers look for a target,
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they must consider the cost or constraints of their short sales. Therefore, institutional
ownership is controlled as a proxy for short-selling constraints from the equity loan sup-
ply. Stock liquidity may also affect the cost of short selling because short sellers sell first
and buy later to repay the shorted stock. Heterogenous beliefs may affect Short-interest
ratio (Figlewski, 1981). A high heterogeneity of beliefs with short-sale constraints leads to
overpricing (Miller, 1977). Given the constraint level for a stock, higher heterogeneity of
beliefs may link to more serious overpricing, which stimulates more short-selling demand
and leads to a higher Short-interest ratio. Divergence of opinion is used as a proxy for
heterogeneity of beliefs, and measured by the coefficient of variation of the analyst earning
forecast. Equity beta measures the systematic risk of the stocks. Both speculative motive
and hedging motive indicate that short sellers may prefer stocks with higher equity betas
(McDonald and Baron, 1973).
Idiosyncratic risk is also a concern of short sellers. Short sellers may avoid targeting
stocks with high idiosyncratic risk because of the difficulty of hedging and the limits
of arbitrage (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). However, stakeholders tend to have less faith
in stocks with high idiosyncratic risk and the prices of such stocks are more vulnerable
to negative information, which may cause short sellers to prefer these stocks. Therefore,
Idiosyncratic risk is controlled. Total return volatility reflects the general stability of stock
returns. Stocks with more volatile returns tend to be more sensitive to negative events
and more likely to be targeted by short sellers. Stock returns may affect the short-interest
ratio. If short sellers believe the return follows a mean-reverting process, they may target
stocks with high past returns (Hurtado-Sanchez, 1978). Thus, annualized stock return in
the previous year is controlled. Analyst coverage may affect short selling as analysts make
the firm more transparent to public. Short sellers are sophisticated investors, and can
better infer valuable information from public sources (Engelberg, Reed, and Ringgenberg,
2012). Thus, Analyst coverage is added. Certain firm characteristics may affect short-
selling activity. For example, young growth firms tend to have weaker relationships with
stakeholders, and it is therefore easier for short sellers to trigger negative cascades as
proposed by Subruhmanyam and Titman (2001). Thus, firm age and market to book ratio
(MTB) are added. Firms with high leverage have less stable capital structures, and are
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more likely to become a target of short sellers. High cash flows indicate a healthy business;
thus, these firms are less likely to be attacked by short sellers. So Leverage and Cash flow
are included. The entire list of control variables can be found in Table 8.
The simultaneous equation system is estimated following the procedure in Chordia,
Huh, and Subruhmanyam (2007). In each year, a two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimator
is calculated for the system. Then, the time-series average of the coefficients is taken as
the final estimator for the system. Table 8 reports the results. Panel A presents the
coefficients for Equation (3), in which Cash ratio is the dependent variable. Panel B
presents the coefficients for Equation (4), in which Short-interest ratio is the dependent
variable. The coefficients are provided in the second column, and the t-statistics are
provided in the third column. The t-statistics are calculated based on Newey and West
(1987) standard errors.
Insert Table 8 here.
In Panel A of Table 8, the coefficient of Short-interest ratio (α1) is significantly positive
at the 1% significance level. This result strongly supports the hypothesis that short sales
have a positive impact on cash holdings. Moreover, Panel B shows that the coefficient of
Cash ratio (β1) is not significant at the 10% level, which indicates that cash holding has
no significant effect on short sales. When short sellers target a firm, contemporaneous cash
holding does not appear to be a crucial consideration. The causality test clearly indicates
that short sales cause cash holding, and that the reverse causality is not true.
The coefficients of other variables in the system also include useful information. In
Panel A, the coefficients are consistent with stylized facts in the cash literature. For
example, Firm size, Leverage and Capital expenditure all have negative effects on cash
holding, whereas MTB, R&D, and Operating income volatility all have positive effects on
cash holding. However, the coefficient of Net equity issuance is positive but not significant,
which indicates that the equity issuance in the previous year does not have a significant
impact on current cash holdings. The proceedings from equity issuances have a positive
impact on the cash holding in the same year, as shown in previous sections. But firms
tend to spend the proceedings in the following year. Compared to the significantly positive
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coefficient of Net debt issuance, firms appear to accumulate cash by issuing debt rather
than by issuing equity, which is consistent with the pecking order theory (Myers, 1984;
Myers and Majluf, 1984).
Panel B of Table 8 illustrates the factors affecting short-selling activity in the market.
Which firms are more likely to be targeted by short sellers? The results in Panel B
provide partial answers. Short sellers prefer stocks with fewer constraints on short selling,
higher heterogeneity of investors’ belief, more volatile performance, and weaker stakeholder
connections. These features can either decrease the direct cost of short-selling activities,
or amplify the impact of negative events. Thus, short sellers expect a higher payoff from
their attacks. For example, Panel B demonstrates that Institutional ownership and stock
liquidity both have positive effects on short selling, which indicates that short sellers
prefer stocks with higher equity loan supply and lower transaction costs. The coefficient
of Divergence of opinion is significantly positive, which indicates that higher heterogeneity
of investors’ belief leads to more short sales.
The coefficients of Equity beta, Idiosyncratic risk, and Return volatility are all sig-
nificantly positive. Equity beta measures systematic risk, Idiosyncratic risk represent
undiversifiable risk, and Return volatility is for total risk of stock returns. Short sellers
enjoy these risks because these features predict more extreme losses during negative events.
Although idiosyncratic risk may increase the risk of short positions, higher expected pay-
off from short sales dominates short sellers’ decision making. After all, short sellers are
typically not investors with high risk aversion. Stock returns in the previous year have
no observable impact on short selling, which indicates that on average short sellers are
not momentum investors. They have private information about firms’ future, which has
not been incorporated into stock prices. However, the significantly negative coefficient of
Cash flow indicates that firms with good business performance in the previous year are
less likely to be shorted.
The coefficient of Firm age is significantly negative and the coefficient of MTB is sig-
nificantly positive, which is consistent with the idea that young and growth firms are more
likely to be targeted by short sellers because they generally have weaker connections with
their stakeholders. The coefficient of Leverage is significantly positive, which indicates that
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short sellers prefer firms with fragile capital structures. In a negative event, highly lever-
aged firms are more likely to go bankrupt. As the owners of residual claims, stockholders
may rush to escape and cause stock prices to dive. The coefficient of Analyst coverage
is not significant, which indicates that on average short sellers tend to acquire negative
information from channels other than financial analysts. All these findings indicate that
short sellers prefer stocks with lower short selling cost, and stocks that are more vulnerable
to negative events.
In sum, in this section, the causality test is performed using a simultaneous equation
system. The results strongly support the hypothesis that short-selling activities cause
more precautionary cash holdings, and that the reverse causality is not true. Endogenizing
short selling does not appear to change other major conclusions from the single-equation
estimation. Furthermore, the results in Panel B facilitate a better understanding of short-
selling activities in financial markets.
8 Conclusions
This paper studies the relationship between stock short sales and corporate cash policy.
Consistent with the precautionary motive of cash holding, the study finds that short-sale
pressure has a positive effect on cash holdings. The fundamental mechanism relies on stock
price informativeness and the importance of a firm’s relationship with its stakeholders.
Short sellers have strong motivation to search and release negative information about
firms, which facilitates the transfer of negative information to stock prices. Stakeholders
learn the negative information, which tends to weaken the relationship with the firms in
trouble. Short sales function as a catalyst for firms’ financial distress in negative events,
which makes the firms more likely to suffer from liquidity shortages and strengthens the
precautionary motives for cash holdings.
This study provides the evidence that both the actual threat of stock short sales and the
potential supply for short sales increase cash holdings. Cash holdings in firms with riskier
business and more R&D investment are more sensitive to short sellers’ attack. Alternative
information channels are controlled, and the impact of short sales remains significant. The
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causality of the relationship is supported by the simultaneous equation system test, which
also sheds light on the understanding of short selling activities in financial markets. Further
research could study how short sales affect other corporate polices. Because managers
consider short sales when making corporate policies, the monitoring role of short sellers
also deserves further investigation.
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Appendix 2: Carson Block versus Sino-Forest.
Carson Block, the short seller who founded Muddy Waters Research, earned his repu-
tation for short selling Chinese stocks traded in North America. In 2011, Block targeted
Sino-Forest Corporation, one of the leading commercial forest plantation operators in
China. Sino-Forest was traded on the Toronto Stock Exchange (TRE) with a market cap-
italization of US$ 4.63 billion as of June 1, 2011. On June 2, the short seller announced
his attack through a report by Muddy Waters Research. The report alleged Sino-Forest
an “established institutional fraud”. On June 3, the stock price of Sino-Forest plunged
71.5% compared to the price one day before the report. US$ 3.3 billion in shareholders’
wealth evaporated. The attack by the short seller triggered tremendous concerns among
investors. Paulson & Co., which held a 14.1% stake as of April 29, 2011, disposed its
entire stake as of June 17, 2011 with a loss of US$720 million15. Sino-Forest denied the
allegation of fraud. However, the situation became increasingly worse in a domino effect.
Rating agencies downgraded its long-term corporate credit rating. Asset sales could not
find potential buyers. The Chinese government was less supportive of the company and
withheld timber cutting licenses16. Its relationships with customers and suppliers became
strained17. On August 26, 2011, the Ontario Securities Commission suspended the shares
of Sino-Forest. On March 30, 2012, Sino-Forest sued Muddy Waters Research and Carson
Block. On the same day, Sino-Forest filed for bankruptcy. On May 22, 2012, the Ontario
Securities Commission filed charges of fraud against the Sino-Forest Corporation and five
of its former executives.
In the case of Sino-Forest, the short seller built up a short position, and then aggres-
sively spread negative information to depress the stock price. The slump of the stock
price triggered serious concerns of stakeholders, such as capital investors, governments,
customers and suppliers. The firm failed to quell the worries of stakeholders. Finally, it
15http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-06-21/paulson-dumping-sino-forest-may-deal-clients-720-
million-loss.html
16http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-04-02/sino-forest-peek-made-buyers-run-away-corporate-
canada.html
17In the release of bankruptcy filing on March 30, 2012, Judson Marin, the vice-Chairman and CEO of
Sino-Forest said “We believe the full value of our assets will only be achieved if we are able to continue
operating the business, and repair and preserve relationships with our customers and suppliers.”
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was abandoned by the stakeholders and went to bankrupt.
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Appendix 1: Descriptions of variables
The names of variables in COMPUSTAT are shown in parentheses.
Variable Descriptions
Acquisition The ratio of acquisition expenditures (AQC) relative to total
book assets (AT).
Analyst coverage Take average of the number of analysts covering the firm across
months within a fiscal year. Then take logarithm of one plus the
average. If a stock is not covered in IBES, set the Analyst
coverage to zero.
Blockholder ownership Total proportion of shares outstanding held by institutional
investors with more than 5% of shares outstanding each.
Cash flow [EBITDA (OIBDP) − interest (XINT) − taxes (TXT) −
common dividends (DVC)]/total assets (AT).
Capital expenditure The ratio of capital expenditures (CAPX) to the book value of
total assets (AT).
Cash ratio The ratio of cash and short-term investment (CHE) to the book
value of total assets (AT).
Divergence of opinion Coefficient of variation of EPS one-year forecasts by
finanacial analysts in IBES.
Dividend dummy A dummy variable equal to one if a firm paid common dividend
(DVC) in that year; zero otherwise.
Equity beta Annual Scholes-Williams beta available from CRSP.
Firm age Calculate the number of months since a stock first appears in
CRSP. Then take logarithm of one plus the number of months.
Operating income volatility Standard deviation of quarterly operating income before
depreciation divided by quarterly book value of assets
across 20 quarters prior to the fiscal year end. Minimum
of eight quarterly observations per firm are required.
Firm size Logarithm of total assets, where the total assets are deflated to
1980 dollars.
Idiosyncratic risk Calculated by an EGARCH model following the procedure of Fu (2009).
Industry cash flow risk The mean of the standard deviations of Cash flow over 10 years
for firms in the same industry (2-digit SIC code), at least 3
firm-year observations required. It follows the variable Industry
Sigma in Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2009).
Illiq Acharya and Pedersen’s (2005) revised version of the original
Amihud (2002) illiquidity:
Illiqi,t = min (0.25 + 0.30 · Illiq Amihudi,t · PMt−1, 30.00), where
PMt−1 is the ratio of the capitalizations of the market portfolio at
the end of the previous fiscal year and of the market portfolio at
the end of July 1962, Illiq Amihudi,t =
1
N
∑N
d=1
|ri,t,d|
DV oli,t,d
, ri,t,d is
stock return on day d in year t, DV oli,t,d is the dollar trading
volume (in million dollars) on day d in year t, and N is the
number of trading days in year t. Trading volumes in NASDAQ
are adjusted by multiplying 0.5.
.
Continued on next page
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Appendix – continued from previous page
Variable Descriptions
Institutional turnover First, calculate institutional churn ratio following Yan and Zhang
(2009): Churn Ratiok,t =
min(Churn buyk,t,Churn sellk,t)∑Nk
i=1(Sk,i,tPi,t + Sk,i,t−1Pi,t−1)/2
,
where Nk is the total number of stocks in the portfolio of
institution k, Sk,i,t is the share number of stock i held by
institution investor k in quarter t, Pi,t is the price of stock i in
quarter t, Churn buyk,t =
Nk∑
i=1, Sk,i,t>Sk,i,t−1
|Sk,i,tPi,t − Sk,i,t−1Pi,t−1 − Sk,i,t−1∆Pi,t|,
Churn sellk,t =
Nk∑
i=1, Sk,i,t≤Sk,i,t−1
|Sk,i,tPi,t − Sk,i,t−1Pi,t−1 − Sk,i,t−1∆Pi,t|, ∆Pi,t
is the change of price as Pi,t − Pi,t−1. Second, following Gaspar,
Massa, and Matos (2005), Institutional turnover is calculated as∑
k∈S
wi,k,t
(
1
4
4∑
r=1
Churn Ratiok,t−r+1
)
, where S is the set of
institutional shareholders of stock i, and wi,k,t is the weight of
investor k in the total percentage held by institutional investors
in year-quarter t. Then an annual Institutional turnover is
calculated as the average across a year.
Institutional ownership Total proportion of shares outstanding held by institutional
investors in 13F.
IPO2 ∼ IPO5 Dummy variables equal to one if the firm went public 2 to 5 years
ago respectively.
Leverage Total debt divided by total assets (AT), where total debt is
long-term debt (DLTT) plus debt in current liabilities (DLC).
Log resprd Logarithm of relative effective bid-ask spread. Relative effective
bid-ask spread is the difference between the execution price and
the mid-point of the prevailing bid-ask quote divided by the
mid-point of the prevailing bid-ask quote.
MTB [Book value of total assets (AT) − book value of equity (CEQ) +
market value of equity (PRCC F× CSHO)]/book value of total
assets (AT).
Net debt issuance [Annual total debt issuance (DLTIS) − debt retirement
(DLTR)]/the book value of total assets (AT).
Net equity issuance [Equity sales (SSTK)− equity purchases (PRSTKC)]/the book
value of total assets (AT).
Net working capital [Net working capital (WCAP) − cash and short-term investment
(CHE)]/total assets (AT)
R&D The ratio of research and development expense (XRD) to total
assets (AT). If XRD is missing then set R&D to 0.
Stock return, annualized Stock return annualized from monthly stock returns in CRSP.
Stock return volatility Standard deviation of daily stock return within a fiscal year.
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Table 1
Descriptive statistics
This table reports the number of firm-year observations, mean, standard deviation, median, minimum
and maximum values of corresponding variables in the sample. The sample period is from 1992 through
2010, except the variable Log resprd that is based on data fromTAQ and starts from 1993∗. The detailed
definitions of variables are listed in Appendix 1 and the criteria for sample construction are described in
the Data and variables section.
N Mean Std. Dev. Median Std. Err. Min Max
Cash ratio 31545 0.19 0.21 0.10 0.0012 0.00 0.99
Short-interest ratio 31240 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.0002 0.00 0.33
Institutional ownership 30882 0.45 0.29 0.45 0.0017 0.00 1.00
Firm size 31545 4.74 1.95 4.62 0.0110 -0.13 11.63
Leverage 31545 0.20 0.19 0.16 0.0011 0.00 1.00
MTB 31545 1.94 1.42 1.50 0.0080 0.23 29.70
Ind. cash flow volatility 31545 0.09 0.04 0.08 0.0002 0.02 0.19
Idiosyncratic risk 27328 0.15 0.07 0.14 0.0004 0.03 1.29
Divergence of opinion 20001 0.18 0.36 0.05 0.0026 0.00 3.70
Institutional turnover 31284 0.27 0.10 0.25 0.0006 0.00 1.38
Illiq 31545 8.07 11.63 0.99 0.0655 0.25 30.00
Log resprd∗ 30326 -5.35 1.32 -5.27 0.0076 -9.17 -1.49
Analyst coverage 31545 1.32 1.01 1.32 0.0057 0.00 3.89
Net equity issuance 31545 0.03 0.16 0.00 0.0009 -1.73 2.18
Net debt issuance 31545 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.0006 -4.31 1.22
Operating inc. vol. 27397 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.0002 0.00 0.74
R&D 31545 0.05 0.09 0.00 0.0005 0.00 0.85
Cash flow 31545 0.04 0.16 0.07 0.0009 -1.51 1.07
Net working capital 31545 0.11 0.18 0.09 0.0010 -0.67 0.92
Capital expenditure 31545 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.0003 0.00 0.45
Acquisition 31545 0.02 0.06 0.00 0.0003 0.00 0.44
Dividend dummy 31545 0.30 0.46 0 0.0026 0 1
IPO2 31545 0.06 0.23 0 0.0013 0 1
IPO3 31545 0.05 0.23 0 0.0013 0 1
IPO4 31545 0.05 0.22 0 0.0012 0 1
IPO5 31545 0.05 0.21 0 0.0012 0 1
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Table 4
Cash ratios across short selling demand-supply groups
In each year, the firms are divided into 4×4 groups by lagged residual Institutional ownership and lagged residual
Short-interest ratio independently, using quartile breakpoints. For each of these 16 subgroups, the averaged cash
ratios are presented in the table. The residuals of Institutional ownership and Short-interest ratio are used to
purge the effect of Firm size. The procedure to calculate the residuals follows Nagel (2005), in which the target
variable is regressed on firm size and square of firm size in each time period. The one-year lag is used to capture
the precautionary motive of cash holdings and alleviate the edogeneity concern. The mean differences between
boundary groups are shown along each dimension. The t tests (with unequal variances) are run for the means of
these boundary groups, and the t-statistics of these tests are reported in parentheses.
Institutional ownership
1 2 3 4 4−1 (t-statistics)
(low) (high)
1 (low) 0.116 0.125 0.144 0.183 0.067 (9.73)
2 0.133 0.127 0.143 0.162 0.029 (4.34)
Short-interest ratio 3 0.161 0.161 0.171 0.209 0.048 (6.38)
4 (high) 0.212 0.241 0.273 0.297 0.085 (10.66)
4−1 0.096 0.116 0.129 0.114
(t-statistics) (13.88) (15.11) (16.81) (14.45)
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Table 5
Institutional ownership regressions
This table reports the impact of short sale supply on corporate cash holdings. Institutional
ownership is used as a proxy of equity loan supply for short sales, and the lagged Institutional
ownership is used in regressions for precautionary motive of cash holdings and endogeneity con-
cern. Columns (2) to (4) demonstrate the results for the basic specification Cash ratioi,t =
Intercept+Inst. Own.i,t−1+Controls+εi,t. In Columns (5) to (7), Short-interest ratio is added in:
Cash ratioi,t = Intercept+ Inst. Own.i,t−1 +Short-interest ratioi,t−1 +Controls+ ηi,t. For each
specification in this table, three different estimators are shown: Fama-MacBeth (1973) estimator
(FM), OLS estimator clustering on both firm and year dimensions (Cluster2), and industry and
year fixed effect estimator (FE). The t-values in FM are calculated based on Newey and West (1987)
standard errors. The t-values in Cluster2 is based on the 2-dimensional standard error proposed
in Petersen (2009). The t-values in FE are adjusted for heteroskedasticity by firm cluster. Fama-
French 48-industry categories are used for industry classification. All t-values are in parentheses
under corresponding coefficients. Statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level are indicated
by ***, **, and * respectively.
Cash ratio FM Cluster2 FE FM Cluster2 FE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Institutional ownership 0.057∗∗∗ 0.064∗∗∗ 0.067∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗
(7.93) (7.52) (7.53) (7.29) (4.35) (5.05)
Short-interest ratio 0.407∗∗∗ 0.366∗∗∗ 0.357∗∗∗
(7.45) (6.27) (7.16)
Firm size -0.013∗∗∗ -0.014∗∗∗ -0.016∗∗∗ -0.014∗∗∗ -0.013∗∗∗ -0.016∗∗∗
(-8.54) (-7.93) (-10.80) (-10.88) (-8.20) (-10.77)
Leverage -0.354∗∗∗ -0.352∗∗∗ -0.348∗∗∗ -0.357∗∗∗ -0.354∗∗∗ -0.352∗∗∗
(-21.12) (-20.57) (-26.79) (-20.90) (-20.59) (-27.02)
MTB 0.022∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗
(10.88) (9.21) (11.44) (11.34) (8.97) (11.04)
Ind. cash flow risk 0.352∗∗∗ 0.395∗∗∗ 0.085 0.354∗∗∗ 0.393∗∗∗ 0.082
(12.75) (6.71) (1.08) (13.54) (6.79) (1.04)
Net equity issuance 0.163∗∗∗ 0.165∗∗∗ 0.159∗∗∗ 0.159∗∗∗ 0.163∗∗∗ 0.155∗∗∗
(7.99) (8.61) (10.56) (7.32) (8.38) (10.29)
Net debt issuance 0.302∗∗∗ 0.262∗∗∗ 0.255∗∗∗ 0.301∗∗∗ 0.261∗∗∗ 0.255∗∗∗
(10.30) (6.49) (6.92) (10.33) (6.34) (6.83)
R&D 0.530∗∗∗ 0.549∗∗∗ 0.421∗∗∗ 0.524∗∗∗ 0.546∗∗∗ 0.418∗∗∗
(12.31) (13.74) (11.01) (11.98) (13.55) (10.94)
Cash flow -0.028 -0.036 -0.034∗∗ -0.023 -0.031 -0.031∗
(-1.48) (-1.52) (-2.17) (-1.33) (-1.33) (-1.95)
Net working capital -0.309∗∗∗ -0.316∗∗∗ -0.349∗∗∗ -0.309∗∗∗ -0.314∗∗∗ -0.348∗∗∗
(-28.51) (-22.66) (-22.71) (-28.18) (-22.11) (-22.58)
Capital expenditure -0.701∗∗∗ -0.689∗∗∗ -0.619∗∗∗ -0.706∗∗∗ -0.687∗∗∗ -0.625∗∗∗
(-19.17) (-18.06) (-18.85) (-18.71) (-17.70) (-18.90)
Acquisition -0.522∗∗∗ -0.504∗∗∗ -0.482∗∗∗ -0.519∗∗∗ -0.495∗∗∗ -0.478∗∗∗
(-16.86) (-14.44) (-17.63) (-16.08) (-13.88) (-17.38)
Dividend dummy -0.029∗∗∗ -0.029∗∗∗ -0.023∗∗∗ -0.026∗∗∗ -0.026∗∗∗ -0.020∗∗∗
(-7.74) (-5.81) (-5.37) (-8.43) (-5.22) (-4.69)
IPO2 0.028∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗
(4.73) (3.96) (6.96) (4.91) (4.15) (7.28)
IPO3 0.010∗ 0.011∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.01 0.011∗ 0.015∗∗∗
(1.78) (1.73) (3.31) (1.72) (1.73) (3.23)
IPO4 0.007∗∗ 0.006 0.01∗∗ 0.006∗ 0.005 0.009∗∗
(2.84) (1.13) (2.28) (2.01) (1.03) (2.01)
IPO5 0.002 0.003 0.006 0.001 0.003 0.005
(0.58) (1.03) (1.31) (0.20) (0.88) (1.04)
Intercept 0.279∗∗∗ 0.278∗∗∗ 0.320∗∗∗ 0.281∗∗∗ 0.279∗∗∗ 0.324∗∗∗
(45.74) (24.77) (23.92) (45.00) (24.51) (24.22)
R2adj 0.54 0.54 0.55 0.54 0.54 0.56
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Table 8
Simultaneous equation system: cash holdings vs. short sales
The system includes two equations with endogenous dependent variables as Cash ratio
and Short-interest ratio: Cash ratiot = α0+α1Short-interest ratiot+
∑
j=2 αjXj,t−1+ηt,
Short-interest ratiot = β0 + β1Cash ratiot +
∑
k=2 βkZk,t−1 + ξt. Endogenous variables
take the values in current year, while exogenous variables (except IPO2 to IPO5) take
the values in the previous year. The coefficients are estimated following the two-step
procedure of Chordia, Huh, and Subrahmanyam (2007). In the first step, 2SLS estimator
is calculated in each year. In the second step, the coefficients of the 2SLS estimator are
averaged across time series dimension. Panel A demonstrates the results of the equation
with Cash ratio as dependent variable. Panel B demonstrates the results of the equation
with Short-interest ratio as dependent variable. Fama-French 48-industry dummies are
controlled but the relevant coefficients are not reported here. The t-statistics are based on
Newey and West (1987) standard errors. Statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%
level are indicated by ***, **, and * respectively.
Coefficient t-statistics
Panel A: Cash ratio
Short-interest ratio 1.656∗∗∗ 6.24
Firm size -0.018∗∗∗ -12.18
Leverage -0.264∗∗∗ -19.80
MTB 0.015∗∗∗ 6.05
Net working capital -0.277∗∗∗ -20.94
Net equity issuance 0.047 1.19
Net debt issuance 0.202∗∗∗ 11.15
Dividend dummy -0.015∗∗∗ -3.15
R&D 0.516∗∗∗ 10.94
Capital expenditure -0.633∗∗∗ -14.98
Acquisition -0.426∗∗∗ -16.50
Cash flow -0.075∗∗ -2.17
Operating income volatility 0.669∗∗∗ 5.93
IPO2 0.002 1.13
IPO3 0.001 0.07
IPO4 0.012∗∗ 2.78
IPO5 0.000 -0.07
Intercept 0.229∗∗∗ 23.07
Panel B: Short-interest ratio
Cash ratio 0.005 0.93
Institutional ownership 0.048∗∗∗ 3.75
Illiq -0.001∗∗∗ -4.67
Divergence of opinion 0.002∗∗∗ 3.32
Equity beta 0.007∗∗∗ 5.63
Idiosyncratic risk 0.072∗∗∗ 8.05
Firm age -0.002∗∗∗ -4.24
Return volatility 0.404∗∗∗ 3.06
Stock return 0.000 -0.55
Leverage 0.013∗∗∗ 8.34
MTB 0.003∗∗∗ 6.06
Cash flow -0.011∗∗∗ -4.39
Analyst coverage 0.001 0.99
Intercept -0.018∗∗∗ -3.72
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Abstract
This paper proposes a theoretical model to illustrate a mechanism by which financial
markets affect corporate investment and cash policies when managers do not learn
from financial markets. Informed trading in financial markets facilitates the incor-
poration of private information into security prices. Corporate stakeholders learn
from the security prices and decide to update their relationships with the firms.
Stakeholders’ decisions may generate new investment opportunities, which require
immediate liquidity support. Precautionary motives drive the firms to hoard liquid-
ity in advance. The model demonstrates that corporate cash holdings can stimulate
new investment opportunities by affecting the stakeholder’s expected utility. The
optimal cash holding is a trade-off between the cost of external financing and the
firm’s expected payoff of the new investment. Market liquidity of securities is linked
to investment and cash policies through firms’ fundamental characteristics. Firms’
relationships with stakeholders and the precision of managers’ private information
both affect firm value.
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1 Introduction
Financial markets have feedback effects on the real economy because of the informational
role of security prices (Bond, Edmans, and Goldstein, 2012). This concept dates back to
Hayek (1945), who proposes that society can share information through the price system.
Decision makers base their actions on the information that is learned from prices (Baumol,
1965; Bond, Goldstein and Prescott, 2010; Goldstein, Ozdenoren, and Yuan, 2013). Cor-
porate managers are influenced by the prices in financial markets when making corporate
policies (Dow and Gorton, 1997; Subruhmanyam and Titman, 1999; Luo, 2005; Chen,
Goldstein and Jiang, 2007; Bakke and Whited, 2010; Fresard, 2012; Edmans, Goldstein,
and Jiang, 2012; Hau and Lai, 2013). One prevalent mechanism through which financial
markets have real effects on corporate policies relies on the idea that managers learn from
prices in financial markets1, which is reasonable and intuitive. However, given the fact
that managers naturally have an informational advantage with regard to the firms they
operate, will financial markets affect corporate policies if managers do not need to learn
from financial markets? This paper proposes a theoretical model to address this concern
and suggests a channel based on the interaction between managers and other stakeholders.
Corporate stakeholders such as customers, suppliers, and capital providers can learn
from financial markets when making decisions. Because these decisions can affect firm
value, managers should take them into account when making corporate policies (Jensen,
2001; Titman, 1984; Cornell and Shapiro, 1987; Subruhmanyam and Titman, 2001; Fee,
Hadlock and Thomas, 2006; Kale and Shahrur, 2007; Banerjee, Dasgupta, and Kim, 2008;
Almanzan, Suarez and Titman, 2009; Bushee and Miller, 2012). The learning of stakehold-
ers (other than managers) and the intersection between these stakeholders and managers
constitute a channel that links financial markets and corporate policies.
The model in this paper includes the following three components: a financial market, a
stakeholder, and a firm manager. The financial market follows the setting of Kyle (1985).
A informed investor, who possesses private information concerning the firm’s future cash
1An alternative mechanism relies on the idea that managers are affected by compensation contracts
that are contingent on market prices. In this paper, the agency problem is not considered; therefore, this
mechanism is not the focus of this paper.
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flow, trades the security in the financial market. The private information is incorporated
into the security price through informed trading. The stakeholder learns from the security
price and makes a decision regarding whether to strengthen the relationship with the firm.2
A new investment opportunity appears when the stakeholder strengthens the relationship
with the firm.
A new investment opportunity requires immediate liquidity support (Huberman, 1984).
The manager makes the investment and cash policies simultaneously to maximize firm
value. The manager has private information regarding future cash flow even earlier than
the informed trader, and therefore, does not need to learn from the financial market.
Expecting the possible future investment opportunity, the manager hoards liquidity in
advance for precautionary motives (Keynes, 1936; Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz and Williamson,
1999; Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach, 2004; Acharya, Almeida, and Campello, 2007;
Han and Qiu, 2007; Bates, Kahle, and Stulz, 2009). Meanwhile, there are costs for cash
holdings.3 The optimal cash holding is a trade-off between the cost of cash holding and
the expected benefit from the new investment opportunity.
This paper demonstrates an endogenous linkage between security market liquidity and
corporate policies. The literature on market microstructure suggests that the market
liquidity associates with information asymmetry (Bagehot, 1971; Copeland and Galai,
1983; Glosten and Milgrom, 1985; Kyle, 1985; Easley and O’Hara, 1987) and has an
impact on the cost of capital (Amihud and Mendelson, 1986; Diamond and Verrecchia
1991), and subsequently on corporate financial polices (Amihud and Mendelson, 1991).
Lipson and Mortal (2009) find empirical evidence that firms with more liquid equity have
lower leverage. It is not an easy task to clearly understand the relationship between stock
liquidity and corporate policies because both concepts are endogenous. The model in
this paper sheds light on this issue by demonstrating that security market liquidity and
2For example, customers may infer that a higher stock price is a signal of good product quality and
thereby decide to buy more products; Suppliers may infer that a higher stock price is a signal of a brighter
future and thereby may increase trade credits or specific investments related to the firm’s business.
3Literature regarding cash holdings suggests costs for cash holdings. For example, Opler, Pinkowitz,
Stulz and Williamson (1999) argue that the cost of holding liquid assets includes a lower rate of return on
these assets and tax disadvantages. Riddick and Whited (2009) argue that firms face a dynamic trade-off
between the tax penalty and the reduction in expected future financing costs.
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corporate policies are linked through the fundamental characteristics of the firm.
This paper relates closely to three existing theoretical papers. The first is Subruh-
manyam and Titman (2001), who demonstrate the feedback effect of stock prices on cor-
porate cash flows when managers do not need to learn from financial markets. If the stock
prices can affect cash flows, it is intuitive that financial markets can influence corporate
policies. This paper extends the work of Subruhmanyam and Titman (2001) by studying
the link between financial markets and corporate policies and by including the manager
as one party in the model. Whereas Subruhmanyam and Titman (2001) do not consider
the possibility of financial constraints, in this paper the manager hoards cash to avoid
future financial constraints. The second related paper is Bond, Goldstein, and Prescott
(2010), who study the market-based corrective actions of economic agents. Bond et al.
focus on the interaction between prices in the financial market and the actions of the
economic agent, assuming that the agent must learn from the financial market for her
decision-making. The model in this paper includes the financial market and two economic
agents (the firm manager and the stakeholder). Only one economic agent (the stakeholder)
learns from the financial market and the interaction between these two economic agents
plays a key role. The third related paper is Goldstein, Ozdenoren, and Yuan (2013), who
study the trading frenzies in financial markets and its feedback effect on corporate capital
providers. Goldstein et al. focus on the mechanism of trading frenzies in financial markets
and the feedback effects on capital providers, whereas this paper focuses on the feedback
effects on corporate policies.
This paper contributes to the literature on the real effect of financial markets by illus-
trating a channel through which the financial market affects corporate policies even when
the manager does not learn from the financial market. The model facilitates a better
understanding of the informational role of prices in financial markets. This paper also
contributes to the literature on market liquidity of financial securities by demonstrating
that market liquidity links with cash and investment policies through the fundamental
characteristics of the firm. Finally, this paper shows a mechanism by which the rela-
tionship with stakeholders and the precision of managers’ private information affect firm
value.
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model.
Section 3 provides an analysis of equilibrium. Section 4 discusses the model implications
and Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
The model includes a firm manager, a stakeholder, and a financial market that trades a
security of the firm. There are three key dates, t = 0, 1, 2. At t = 0, the firm has the
asset in place, which generates cash flow only at t = 2. At t = 0, the firm manager knows
the payoff of the asset in place, whereas others are uncertain about the payoff. However,
the manager can not share the private information with others in a credible way. In this
model, the agency problem is not considered, and therefore the firm and the manager will
be used interchangeably. At t = 0, the manager makes the investment policy and the cash
policy.
At t = 1, the informed trader appears in the financial market and the private informa-
tion is incorporated into the security price. Following Subruhmanyam and Titman (2001),
the stakeholder can learn from the security price. However, instead of many stakeholders,
this paper has only one representative stakeholder (think of a marginal stakeholder in
Subruhmanyam and Titman (2001)). Based on the information learned from the security
price, the stakeholder decides whether to strengthen the relationship with the firm.4 If
so, a new investment opportunity arises. This part of the model can be regarded as a
reduced form of Subruhmanyam and Titman (2001). When the opportunity is available
at t = 1, the firm invests using the cash holdings. At t = 2, the uncertainty is realized
and all parties are paid. All parties are risk-neutral and the discount factor is set to 1.
2.1 Financial market
Following Subruhmanyam and Titman (2001), only the security of the asset in place is
traded in the financial market. The microstructure of the financial market is in line with
4For example, customers may strengthen the relationship by buying more products; suppliers may
strengthen the relationship by providing more trade credits or invest more in the business related to the
firm; capital providers may strengthen the relationship by providing cheaper financing.
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Kyle (1985). At t = 1, an informed trader and a noise trader submit market orders simul-
taneously to a competitive market maker. The informed trader owns private information
regarding the payoff of the asset in place at t = 2, which is knows by the stakeholder as
v˜ = F¯ + δ,
where F¯ is expected value and δ ∼ N(0, σ20). The private information owned by the
informed trader is denoted as δˆ, which is the realization of δ at t = 2. The informed trader
uses a linear trading strategy
x˜(δˆ) = α + β · δˆ,
where x˜ is the trading volume, α and β are coefficients. The trading volume of the noise
trader, u˜, follows a normal distribution
u˜ ∼ N(0, σ2u).
The market maker, who only observes the aggregate order flow x˜ + u˜, sets a price P to
clear the market:
P (x˜+ u˜) = E[v˜|x˜+ u˜] = µ+ λ(x˜+ u˜).
The objective of the informed trader is to maximize her expected payoff at t = 2:
E[(F¯ + δˆ)− P (x˜+ u˜)] · x˜.
2.2 The stakeholder
At t = 1, the stakeholder observes the price P after the informed trading and decides
whether to strengthen the relationship with the firm. The stakeholder’s utility function is
as follows:
ρ1(F¯ + δ) + ρ2G(I),
where ρ1 and ρ2 are the weights for payoffs from the asset in place and the new investment,
respectively, G(·) is the payoff function for the new investment, which is knows by the
stakeholder and satisfies the standard properties such as G′(I) > 0, G′′(I) < 0, G(0) = 0,
and G′(0) = +∞, and I is the firm’s investment. However, the stakeholder must make
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the decision before the firm invests, meaning that I should be understood as the expected
firm investment. The rational stakeholder understands that the firm will not invest more
than the first best investment level I∗0 = (G
′)−1(1) and can not invest more than its cash
holding C, which is assumed to be observable at t = 1, i.e., I 6 min{I∗0 , C}. However,
the stakeholder does not know the cost of cash holdings, therefore, can not directly infer
δˆ through C observed.
The stakeholder has a threshold w for her decision-making. The stakeholder strength-
ens her relationship if and only if
E[ρ1(F¯ + δ) + ρ2G(I)|P,C] > w. (1)
The threshold w can be understood as a proxy for the original relationship between the
stakeholder and the firm. The stronger the original relationship is, the lower the threshold
w is.
2.3 The firm manager
At t = 0, the manager makes corporate policies to maximize the expected firm value. At
t = 0, the manager is the only one who owns the private information (δˆ) regarding the
value of the asset in place; however, the manager cannot credibly transfer this information
to others and is not allowed to trade in the financial market. The manager expects that at
t = 1 certain outsider will learn the private information and begin the informed trading.
At that time, a new investment opportunity may appear depending on the stakeholder’s
reaction to the security price. Precautionary motives drive the firm to save cash at t = 0
because cash needs to be in place before the investment opportunity arises, as in Huberman
(1984).
Assume there is no cash holding at the beginning of t = 0. To hoard liquidity, the firm
must raise external financing at t = 0 and save until t = 1 to support the new investment.
A negative payout at t = 0 indicates this external financing, whereas the payout at t = 1
or t = 2 must be non-negative. In this model, the cost of cash holding is represented as
extra external financing; in other words, if the manage expects to invest C at t = 1, she
has to raise (1 + κ) · C at t = 0. Here κ > 0 is a measure for the cost of cash holding.
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After the investment at t = 1, the firm is supposed to pay out the remaining cash because
there is no longer a need for cash holding.
The manager’s objective function is as follows:
max{d0 + d1 + d2}, s.t.
d0 = −(1 + κ) · C < 0
d1 = p · (C − I) + (1− p) · C
d2 = (F¯ + δˆ) + p ·G(I)
where di is the payout at t = i, i=0, 1, 2, p is the ex ante probability of the new investment
opportunity depending on the stakeholder’s action, C is the cash holding at t = 1, and κ
is the cost of cash holding.
3 Equilibrium analysis
The equilibrium is defined as {x, P ; as;C, I}, where x is the volume of informed trading,
P is the security price at t = 1, as is the strategy
5 of the stakeholder, C is the target cash
holding at t = 1, and I is the firm’s investment strategy6.
The equilibrium is derived backwards from t = 1. According to the setting of the
financial market, the traders and the market maker will not be affected by the actions
of the stakeholder and the firm manager. Therefore, at t = 1, in the financial market
{x(δˆ), P (x, u˜)} is derived as follows
x˜(δˆ) = βδˆ (2)
P (x˜+ u˜) = F¯ + λ(x˜+ u˜), (3)
where β = σu/σ0, λ =
σ0
2 · σu . The quantity
1
λ
=
2 · σu
σ0
can be regarded as a market
liquidity measure for the security. Therefore, given σ0, the more volatile the noise trading
is, the more liquid the security is. The noise trader facilitates the informed investor to
5The action set of the stakeholder includes “to strengthen” and “not to strengthen” the relationship
with the firm.
6The investment strategy I is made at t = 0, which states how the firm should invest according to the
stakeholder’s action at t = 1.
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disguise informed trading in front of the market maker.
The stakeholder observes the security price P and infers the information about δ for
her decision-making. To the stakeholder, the condition (1) is equivalent to
ρ1(F¯ + E[δ|P ]) + ρ2E[G(I)|C] > w, (4)
where
E[δ|P ] = E[δ|P = F¯ + λ(x˜+ u˜)]
= E[δ|P = F¯ + λ(β · δ + u˜)]
= E[δ|δ + 2λu˜ = 2(P − F¯ )]
= P − F¯ .
Therefore, the stakeholder will strengthen her relationship with the firm if and only if
ρ1P + ρ2E[G(I)|C] > w, (5)
where I 6 min{I∗0 , C}.
At t = 1, if Condition (5) is satisfied, a new investment opportunity will appear and
the manager can invest using cash holdings. As expected by the stakeholder, the new
investment will be less than the first best level I∗0 . The remaining cash holdings, if any,
will be paid out. If Condition (5) is not satisfied, no investment opportunity will appear
and the manager will pay out all of the cash holdings.
At t = 0, the manager makes the decision of cash holding C. The manager knows
that the stakeholder expects that the firm will not invest more than I∗0 , therefore, the cash
holdings in excess of I∗0 will neither affect stakeholder’s decision, nor be invested at t = 1.
The optimal cash holdings must satisfy C 6 I∗0 , which means I 6 C 6 I∗0 . Furthermore,
given the cost of cash holdings, any cash holdings in excess of the new investment can
not be optimal. Therefore, the optimal cash holdings must satisfy C = I 6 I∗0 . To the
stakeholder, E[G(I)|C] = G(C).
At t = 0, the manager owns the private information δˆ. However, the security price P
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at t = 1 is uncertain to her because of the existence of noise trader:
P |δ=δˆ = F¯ + λ(x˜+ u˜)
= F¯ + λ(βδˆ + u˜)
= F¯ +
δˆ
2
+ λu˜, u˜ ∼ N(0, σ2u),
i.e.,
P |δ=δˆ ∼ N
(
F¯ +
δˆ
2
,
σ20
4
)
. (6)
At t = 0, from the manager’s viewpoint, the ex ante probability for the stakeholder to
strengthen the relationship, i.e., the probability a new investment opportunity will appear
at t = 1, is given as
p(C) = Prob{ρ1P + ρ2G(C) > w}
= Prob
{
P > w − ρ2G(C)
ρ1
}
= Prob
{
P − (F¯ + δˆ/2)
σ0/2
> 2[w − ρ2G(C)− ρ1(F¯ + δˆ/2)]
ρ1σ0
}
,
i.e.
p(C) = Φ
[
2
σ0
ρ2
ρ1
G(C) +
2[ρ1(F¯ + δˆ/2)− w]
ρ1σ0
]
, (7)
where Φ[·] is the probability distribution function of standard normal distribution, C =
I 6 I∗0 is cash holdings at t = 1, I is the investment at t = 1 given the opportunity is
available.
The objective function of the manager can be written as
max
06I=C6I∗0
{d0 + d1 + d2}, s.t.
d0 = −(1 + κ)C 6 0
d1 = p(C)(C − I) + (1− p(C))C
d2 = (F¯ + δˆ) + p(C) ·G(I)
which is equivalent to
max
06I=C6I∗0
{(F¯ + δˆ) + p(I) · [G(I)− I]− κI}. (8)
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The function in (8) is continuous. There must exist an I∗ ∈ [0, I∗0 ] that solves the
optimization in (8). Given G′(0) = +∞ and κ > 0, this I∗ must be strictly positive and
less than the first best investment I∗0 , i.e., I
∗ ∈ (0, I∗0 ). Therefore, at t = 0 the firm must
raise external financing (1+κ) · I∗, which guarantees the cash holdings at t = 1 as I∗. The
expected firm value is {(F¯ + δˆ) + p(I∗) · [G(I∗) − I∗] − κI∗}, where p(C) is given in (7).
The objective function (8) indicates that the optimal cash holding is a trade-off between
the expected payoff of the investment opportunity and the cost of cash holding. The cost
of cash holding (κ) decreases the optimal cash holding and has a negative effect on firm
value. The equilibrium of the model is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 The equilibrium of the model
Under the model setting described in Section 2, equilibrium is given as follows:
• The manager : at t = 0, the firm raises external financing (1 +κ) · I∗, where I∗ is the
optimal solution to the optimization problem (8). This external financing guarantees
the cash holding I∗ at t = 1. At t = 1, if an investment opportunity is available, the
firm invests the cash saving I∗, otherwise pays out the cash.
• The financial market : at t = 1, the informed trading volume is given by Equation
(2) and the security price is given by Equation (3).
• The stakeholder : at t = 1, observing the security price P and the firm’s cash holding
C, the stakeholder strengthens her relationship with the firm if and only if Condition
(5) is satisfied.
4 Implications
This section demonstrates several implications of the model, in which corporate policies
and financial markets are linked through the shareholder’s reaction to the security price.
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4.1 The stakeholder, cash holding, growth opportunity, and firm
value
According to Equation (7), corporate cash holdings C can stimulate new investment op-
portunities by affecting the stakeholder’s expected payoff. p(C) is increasing with C if and
only if C < I∗0 , where I
∗
0 is the first best investment for G(I).
As shown in Equations (7) and (8), the stakeholder affects firm value through the
growth opportunity, i.e., the probability of the new investment. The relationship between
the stakeholder and the firm has a positive effect on the probability p(C). The relationship
is measured by the threshold w. A low value of w indicates a strong relationship, and
consequently, a better chance in the future. This can be described as a reputation effect.
If the firm has built a good reputation through previous deals with the stakeholder, the
firm will benefit in future developments. For example, in practice, a good relationship
with banks enables the firm to obtain bank loans. A small increase in the security price
may persuade banks to provide cheaper financing. Accordingly, the lower cost of capital
may generate more projects with positive NPVs. A similar argument can be made with
regard to customers and the quality of a firm’s products. By substituting (7) into (8), the
envelope theorem implies that the relationship with the stakeholder has a positive effect
on firm value.
The preference of the stakeholder can also affect a firm’s growth opportunity. Equation
(7) shows that the relative importance of a new investment to the asset in place, ρ2/ρ1,
increases p(C) and firm value (envelope theorem). In practice, new generation of products
are emphasized in commercial advertisements, which not only demonstrate the competi-
tive advantage to its rivals but also affect stakeholder’s preferences and stimulate growth
opportunities.
These arguments are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 A moderate cash holding has a positive effect on growth opportu-
nities7. Mangers can stimulate future growth opportunities and increase firm value by
7In this model, C is assumed to be observable to the stakeholder. However, if this assumption is
relaxed, Proposition 2 suggests that managers have the incentive to announce or even exaggerate the cash
holdings to the public.
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strengthening relationships with stakeholders, or by influencing stakeholders’ preferences
(ρ2/ρ1).
4.2 Security market liquidity vs. corporate policies
The informational role of the security price is crucial in the mechanism of the model. The
literature regarding market microstructure suggests that market liquidity is associated
with information asymmetry (Bagehot, 1971; Copeland and Galai, 1983; Glosten and Mil-
grom, 1985; Kyle, 1985; Easley and O’Hara, 1987). Market liquidity can affect the cost of
capital (Amihud and Mendelson, 1986; Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991) and subsequently
corporate policies (Lipson and Mortal, 2009). This model focuses on the cash and invest-
ment policies, and illustrates that security market liquidity, cash policy and investment
policy are linked through the business risk σ0, a fundamental characteristics of the firm.
The equilibrium analysis indicates market liquidity as
1
λ
=
2 · σu
σ0
, which is affected by
the firm’s business risk σ0. Meanwhile, Equation (7) shows that the ex ante probability of
the investment opportunity is also affected by σ0. Through the objective function (8), σ0
may also affect investment and cash policies. The following proposition demonstrates the
linkage between security market liquidity and corporate policies.
Proposition 3 Investment, cash holding and security market liquidity
Security market liquidity is positively linked with the optimal investment and cash
holding through the firm’s business risk σ0 if and only if the following condition is satisfied:
1
σ20
<
1
[aG(I∗)− b]2 +
G′(I∗)− 1
aG′(I∗)(G(I∗)− I∗)(aG(I∗)− b) , (9)
where I∗ is the optimal cash holding and investment in (8), a =
2ρ2
ρ1
, and b =
w − ρ1(F¯ + δˆ/2)
ρ1
.
The detailed proof is in the appendix.
4.3 Precision of the manager’s private information and firm value
The model in Section 2 assumes that the manager knows the accurate payoff from the
asset in place as F¯ + δˆ. In this section, the model is generalized to allow some uncertainty
129
in the manager’s private information. Assume that at t = 0 the manager knows
δM = δˆ + θ,
where δˆ is the realization of δ at t = 2, and the noise θ ∼ N(0, σ2θ). Then at t = 0, the
manager predicts the security price (t = 1) as
P |δ=δˆ+θ = F¯ + λ(x˜+ u˜)
= F¯ + λ[β(δˆ + θ) + u˜]
= F¯ +
δˆ
2
+
θ
2
+ λu˜, u˜ ∼ N(0, σ2u), θ ∼ N(0, σ2θ),
∼ N
(
F¯ +
δˆ
2
,
σ20 + σ
2
θ
4
)
.
The ex ante probability of the investment opportunity becomes
pM(I) = Φ
[
2√
σ20 + σ
2
θ
ρ2
ρ1
G(I) +
2[ρ1(F¯ + δˆ/2)− w]
ρ1
√
σ20 + σ
2
θ
]
. (10)
Therefore, the precision of the manager’s private information (1/σθ) affects the ex ante
probability of a new investment opportunity. Denote I∗M as the optimal solution of (8)
given (10). Then the sign of the effect depends on the following condition:
ρ1(F¯ + δˆ/2) + ρ2G(I
∗
M) > w. (11)
If (11) is satisfied, the information precision has a positive impact on the ex ante probability
of investment opportunity; Otherwise, the impact is negative. Combining (10) and (8),
the envelope theorem implies that the precision of the private information has a similar
impact on firm value as it does on p(C). This finding indicates that the manager has a
stronger motive to improve the precision of her private information given an optimistic
expectation regarding the growth opportunity. The effects are summarized in the following
proposition.
Proposition 4 The precision of a manager’s private information has a positive impact
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on the ex ante probability of investment opportunity and firm value if condition (11) is
satisfied. Otherwise, the impact is negative.
5 Conclusions
This paper proposes a theoretical model to illustrate a channel that links financial markets
and corporate policies when managers do not learn from the financial market. The infor-
mational role of the security price and the effect of stakeholder decisions on investment
opportunities are crucial in the mechanism. In equilibrium, a manager formulates the cash
policy and the investment policy simultaneously. Security market liquidity is linked with
corporate policies through the fundamental characteristics of the firm. The relationship
with the stakeholder and the precision of the manager’s private information can affect firm
value.
Future research might focus on enriching the model by considering leverage and bankruptcy,
or by allowing the financial market to be affected by corporate policies. In that case, there
is a trade-off between the enhanced model and the technical complexity, because there
may exist multiple non-linear equilibria. Another direction for future research would be
to empirically examine the link between financial markets and corporate policies, e.g., the
short sale or security liquidity in financial markets and the corporate cash policy.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 3
Security market liquidity,
1
λ
=
2σu
σ0
, is decreasing on firm business risk σ0.
Denote the objective function of the manager as
v(I) = p(I)[G(I)− I]− κI + (F¯ + δˆ).
The first order condition is
p′(I)[G(I)− I] + p(I)[G′(I)− 1]− κ = 0, (12)
where p(I) = Φ
[
1
σ0
(a ·G(I)− b)
]
, a =
2ρ2
ρ1
, b =
w − ρ1(F¯ + δˆ/2)
ρ1
, and
p′(I) =
a
σ0
G′(I)φ
[
1
σ0
(aG(I)− b)
]
, φ[·] is the density function of standard normal distri-
bution.
Denote p(I) as p(I(σ0), σ0). Take partial derivative with respect to σ0 in equation (12):[
∂2p(I, σ0)
∂σ20
∂I
∂σ0
+
∂p′(I, σ0)
σ0
]
[G(I)− I] + p′(I, σ0)[G′(I)− 1] ∂I
∂σ0
+ [
∂p′(I, σ0)
∂I
∂I
∂σ0
+
∂p(I, σ0)
∂σ0
][G′(I)− 1] + p(I, σ0)G′′(I) ∂I
∂σ0
= 0.
Therefore,
∂I∗
∂σ0
= − 1
v′′(I∗)
[
∂p′
∂σ0
(G(I∗)− I∗) + ∂p
∂σ0
(G′(I∗)− 1)
]
. (13)
Substitute
∂p
∂σ0
= φ
[
aG(I∗)− b
σ0
] [
−aG(I
∗)− b
σ20
]
,
and
∂p′
∂σ0
= − a
σ20
G′(I∗)φ
[
aG(I∗)− b
σ0
]
− a
σ0
G′(I∗)
aG(I∗)− b
σ0
φ
[
aG(I∗)− b
σ0
] [
−aG(I
∗)− b
σ20
]
= φ
[
aG(I∗)− b
σ0
]
G′(I∗)
a
σ20
[
(aG(I∗)− b)2
σ20
− 1
]
,
into (13), and notice G(I∗)−I∗ > 0 and G′(I∗)−1 > 0 since I∗ 6 I∗0 , and notice v′′(I∗) < 0,
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a sufficient and necessary condition for a negative
∂I∗
∂σ0
is
1
σ20
<
1
[aG(I∗)− b]2 +
G′(I∗)− 1
aG′(I∗)(G(I∗)− I∗)(aG(I∗)− b) . (14)
It means security market liquidity is positively linked with optimal investment and cash
holding through the firm’s business risk if and only if condition (14) is satisfied. Done. 2
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